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The Littoral Combat Ship is intended to be minimally manned and designed to be 
manned by qualified officers to carry out and operate its multi-faceted mission.  This 
study examines officer manpower and assignment as compared to requirements of ship 
classes with similar missions that Littoral Combat Ship is intended to replace.  A 
recommendation is made to increase the officer manpower requirement.  A new manning 
metric is presented that accounts for the characteristics of demographic and occupational 
standards of previous Littoral Combat Ship officers.  The research presents a qualitative 
comparative analysis and provides a model framework for future Littoral Combat Ship 
manning once a larger inventory of officers have completed tours and more officer data 
are available.   
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In today’s Navy, decision makers are familiar and associated with specific 
warfare missions and capabilities that translate into specific ship design.  In general, 
ships’ large sizes and deep drafts have limited the scope of their missions to the open, 
“blue-water” oceans of the world.  The Navy has recognized the need for a more versatile 
vessel that will allow for in-shore operations that are closer in proximity to the size of a 
potential in-shore threat.  The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was developed to be capable 
of countering multiple threats with a crew that could fit into a single school bus.  The 
proposed crew is only forty personnel, and the ship is designed to operate and fight, if 
necessary, in the increasingly important “brown-water” areas around the world.  These 
types of missions (Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Anti-Mine 
Warfare) are typically executed by vessels with crews in the hundreds that cannot operate 
in the littorals and must do so from a greater stand-off distance.  The LCS’s design and 
objective are becoming vogue after decades of planning, trials, and tribulations.   
After three different hull types were designed by Lockheed Martin, General 
Dynamics, and Raytheon, the Freedom-class variant by Lockheed Martin and the 
Independence-class variant by General Dynamics were chosen for future construction.  
The Mission Packages (MP) that will be embarked on each variant will enable different 
operational detachments with different missions to operate with the LCS sea-frame crew 
in an effort to reduce overall manning.  Both variants are shorter and have a shallower 
draft than standard surface ships.  The Freedom-class measures at 378 feet and drafts 
12.8 feet, while the Independence-class measures at 419 feet and drafts 14.1 feet.  They 
are both capable of achieving speeds of over 40 knots and launching and recovering small 
craft and helicopters to include the unmanned Firescout (Navy Fact File-Littoral Combat 
Ship, 2012). 
To date, there are only three commissioned Littoral Combat Ships.  The crew 
members on each ship consist of eight officers and thirty-two enlisted.  These manpower 
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requirements were determined by the design of the LCS and its multiple mission focus 
that is to be augmented by embarked MPs.  As more ships commission, it becomes 
increasingly important to understand the capabilities of each ship and how those 
requirements are determined and manned.  As officers and enlisted personnel continue to 
man-the-rails and the Navy brings more of these ships to life, it is crucial to consider why 
LCS only requires forty personnel and to understand the characteristics of the associated 
manpower.  Furthermore, the minimally manned sea-frame and embarked MP personnel 
are vital in the plans for the LCS to replace ship classes and assume the roles for the 
different warfare areas they once encompassed.  
The sea-frame will make the design capability of Littoral Combat Ships unique as 
they operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments.  In particular, the ship was 
designed to have a rotational crew; one crew is relieved by another so that the sea-frame 
may spend more time in an operational status at sea.  Currently, the LCS sea-frame is 
manned by a rotational Gold and Blue crew that conducts “crew swapping.”  These 
crews, responsible for the sea-frame, and embarked MPs will encompass the same 
missions as the Oliver Hazard Perry-class Guided Missile Frigates (FFG), Avenger-class 
Mine Countermeasure (MCM) ships, and Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters (MHC).  
However, minimal manpower is only as effective as the distribution of personnel in place 
to carry out the actual manpower required work.  
The U.S. Navy has already placed orders for LCS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 to be 
delivered by 2015.  The mission of the LCS is defined in the littorals.  They are capable 
of traveling fast with embarked operators for various missions that cover a wide spectrum 
of warfare areas and has the sustainability to do so over an extended period of time 
(Program Executive Office, 2012).  These additional sea-frames, and their 
complementing MPs, are coming online as operational assets.  It is imperative that their 
manpower characteristics be determined well in advance and with the proper warfare 
characteristics held in high consideration when formulated.   
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B. PURPOSE 
This purpose of this study is to provide a historical overview that examines 
manpower requirements and occupational standards across different platforms in an 
attempt to provide a cross comparison to the LCS.  Since the LCS is such a new platform, 
it is important to provide decision makers the optimal courses of action when determining 
the officer characteristics and occupational standards required to successfully operate this 
new ship.  Additionally, this thesis will examine different metrics that can be used to 
assess and determine officer placement such as the “Reporting Senior Cumulative 
Average,” “Promotion Status,” and “Member Trait Average” of officers.  This will aid in 
how to apply officer inventory to LCS personnel requirements. 
The study will concentrate on the minimal officers assigned to the LCS and what 
their billets entail while making comparison to their counterparts on other ship classes.  It 
will include a historical overview of the ship characteristics, missions, and the officer 
complement of the FFGs, MCMs, and MHCs.  Several characteristics that make up an 
officer’s personal and professional qualifications will be identified and how these 
qualifications may affect officer placement.  Currently, there is not sufficient LCS officer 
assignment information available, and therefore, a quantitative analysis determining 
whether their specific characteristics make them a “good fit” for the LCS billet was not 
possible.  However, the research can be of use for future studies in comparing officer 
characteristics with how an officer may be assigned and predict performance on a naval 
vessel.  This study will provide guidance on a potential framework that can be used in 
further quantitative research on LCS manpower. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary objective of this research is to examine the manpower requirements 
of the LCS Officer corps and its occupational standards.  This will be based on historical 
research into the ship classes that the LCS is replacing.   
A secondary focus of this research will be on the process of the manning metric 
for the assignment of officers to the LCS.  This will provide information that can 
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potentially aid how the Navy uses officer characteristics in regards to occupational 
standards and their ranking as metrics when assigning personnel to the LCS.   
The primary research questions are the following: 
 What significant differences exist from the transition of prior ship classes 
to the LCS in regards to manpower qualifications and characteristics? 
 What officer characteristics and rankings may the Navy use when 
assigning an officer to a LCS platform, based on historical and ship-
specific requirements, and how may the assignment be applied?  
The secondary research questions are the following: 
 How may the process of officer assignment change when an officer’s 
ranking is contained within the manning metric? 
 How may additional requirements of officer characteristics be 
incorporated into the manning metric? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope will include: (1) a review of LCS and other ship class manpower; (2) 
occupational standards and watch qualifications for officers based on operational 
requirements; (3) examination of the current assignment metric; and (4) summary, 
conclusions, and recommendations. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This study is organized into four chapters.  Chapter I provides an introduction, 
and Chapter II a literature review that traces the history of the LCS program.  Chapter III 
takes an in-depth looks at the officer manpower of the LCS and the ship classes it intends 
to replace.  Chapter IV covers the current manning metric and the identified occupational 
standards and watch qualifications that may prove of importance in future manning 
metrics.  Chapter V includes the conclusions and recommendations to the study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provides background information on the Littoral Combat 
Ship.  This review traces the Littoral Combat Ship as an initial idea to its actual delivery 
to the United States Navy.  It examines the design specifications for the Freedom-class 
and Independence-class variants, as well as the composition of the Mission Packages.  
The content of each section is directly out of each source annotated in the title section.   
A. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS: 
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP, AN EXAMINATION OF ITS POSSIBLE 
CONCEPTS OF OPERATION 
The importance of this report is that it builds a foundation for understanding how 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was conceived and provides extensive background 
information on the thoughts and dilemmas that were considered by some of the military’s 
highest ranking officers.  More importantly, this report provides information on the 
Mission Packages (MP) that the LCS will embark, the MP’s respective capabilities, and 
how the capabilities were concluded upon (Murphy, 2010).   
Martin Murphy writes in this Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA) report about the origin of the LCS and the possible plans that lie ahead for its 
use.  The report answers the following questions: 
 What are the projected missions?  
 Where and how could they be employed?  
 What do the ships’ characteristics enable them to do that other ships 
cannot?  
 What additional missions could they accomplish if certain modifications 
were made or capabilities added? 
He continues with an introduction that unveils some unusual features about the 
LCS wherein the hull types and designs were planned without passing through the normal 
requirements process.  He states that no formal “a priori” understanding of how ships 
would be operated and their operational requirements were confirmed before the design 
was decided (Murphy, 2010).   
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The conception of the LCS extends back into the late 1990s with Vice Admiral 
Arthur Cebrowski, USN, as the head of the Naval War College and Navy Warfare 
Development Command.  VADM Cebrowski is quoted in advancing four themes for the 
future of maritime force: 
1.) Networks should be the central organizing principle of the fleet, and its 
sensing and fighting power should be distributed across multiple manned and unmanned 
platforms; 
2.) The fleet sensor component should collect, collate and interpret data faster 
than any enemy who was not networked to the same degree, giving US forces a major 
competitive advantage through “speed of command”; 
3.) The fleet should become the nation’s “assured access” force; and 
4.) Numbers of hulls count (quantity had its own quality) and consequently the 
fleet’s combat power should be distributed over as many interconnected platforms and 
systems as the budget allowed (Murphy, 2010).  
VADM Cebrowski stated that a small, fast ship was needed to counter anti-access 
and area-denial strategies (A2/AD) in the littorals.  This access, coupled with larger strike 
capabilities of other naval combatants, would support counter operations to mine and 
submarine warfare, Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC).  
Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark supported VADM Cebrowski in 
early 2000s in the belief that the Navy, as quoted in the CSBA: 
 Needed to assure access to the world’s littoral regions for the Joint Force; 
 Navy support the Marine Corps concept of launching operations from a 
littoral-based “sea base” that would need defending; 
 Battle fleet operations would revolve around dense networks of distributed 
sensors and weapons; 
 Distributed networks paved the way for a revised fleet architecture; 
 The revised architecture required a revised fleet deployment patter; and  
 To discharge these roles effectively the Navy would no longer be able to 
draw upon an adequate number of intermediate-size multi-purpose ships 
because these were too expensive to acquire in the numbers needed. 
Consequently, new, less expensive vessels had to be acquired.  
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As the Cold War ended there was a shift in emphasis to littoral missions.  The 
new focus moved from the nuclear age and blue-water confrontations to rogue and 
insurgent nations where an expeditionary force would make brown-water landings that 
required support and protection.  According to Murphy, the Surface Combatant Concept 
((SC)-21), which would consist of a new class of Cruisers (CG-21) and Destroyers (DD-
21), became the answer to this littoral issue.  Nineteen CG-21s and seventeen DD-21s 
were planned as multi-mission littoral ships that would replace the Ticonderoga-class 
Guided Missile Cruisers.  Each was designed to displace approximately 9000 tons, but 
the number grew to 14,500, too large for the littorals.  In addition to the growing 
displacement, the price tag for each ship grew.  Armament and displacement fell to the 
bottom of the list of priorities in order to reduce costs.  In the end, only three DD-21s 
would be ordered as the newly named Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000).  The current Arleigh 
Burke-class Destroyers and Ticonderoga-class Cruisers would continue service.  These 
ships would be, and currently are, “sufficient in land-attack capability but lack littoral 
missions” (Murphy, 2010).   
In 2001, the initial plan for fifty LCS was proposed to replace the thirty ships of 
the Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigates (FFG), fourteen ships of the Avenger-class Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM), and twelve Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters (MHC).  The 
new LCS would be “plug and fight” because of the capability to trade out MPs, to which 
the LCS's design was centered on, and not displacement (Murphy, 2010).  What drove the 
size and smaller displacement is summarized in the following: 
 Independent Operations: LCS had to be able to operate up to 4000 miles 
for fourteen to twenty-one days.  These requirements drove sea-
worthiness, bunker capacity, and habitability. 
 Battle-force capability: 3000 tons was lowest practical for a ship operating 
with carriers. 
 Speed: In excess of 40 knots determined size of machinery space. 
 Mission Packages: Space to carry MPs that weighed between 180 and 210 
metric tons. 
 Weapons and Equipment: Two MH-60 helicopters or UAVs, and an 11m 
RHIB.  Stability needed to launch/recover in sea states of three to five. 
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 Modularity: MPs allows for different configurations based on 
requirements. 
The following advantages were associated with the design: 
 Adaptability: Ability to embark different MPs through the course of the 
ship’s life cycle which would increase operability and reduce costs.  
 Areas of Influence: LCS will be able to gain access to certain areas of the 
world where other combatants may not because of the different drafts of 
the vessels.  LCS drafts 15 feet while other surface combatants draft 
between 28 and 35 feet.  This shallow draft opens the LCS to “access 1111 
world-wide ports instead of 362” and areas such as the Northern Arabian 
Gulf (Murphy, 2010). 
 Battle Network: Ability to communicate with other assets. 
 Flight Deck: Lockheed Martin design is 1.5x larger than other combatants, 
with General Dynamics being 2x larger. 
 Crew Integration and Optimization: According to the CSBA, the crew size 
is expected to rise to around one-hundred.  But it is stressed that this 
number is still half of FFGs.  The LCS will also incorporate rotational 
crews.   
The CSBA covered that LCS operations may be carried out independently or in 
groups.  For independent operations, ideal conditions would consist of low-level risks.  
This is based on the fact that the LCS would only have itself to rely on for protection.  
Some of the independent operations are fishery protection, counter-narcotics, and 
counter-piracy operations, among others (Murphy, 2010).  The LCS’s speed is an 
advantageous supplement to its ability to deploy various aircraft in support of these 
operations. 
In group operations with other LCS, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-
Surface Warfare (SUW) and Anti-Mine Warfare (MIW) would be carried out.  In ASW, 
group operations would allow for “optimizing collective resources” (Murphy, 2010).  
Although there was confidence in the CSBA for the LCS to operate independently in 
SUW conditions, it was envisioned that they would work in groups in order to repel small 
boat attacks.  For MIW, a MIW-capable LCS would pair with a SUW capable LCS.  This 
would allow for mine neutralization as well as thwart surface threats. 
In group operations with other classes of ships the LCS(s) would act as “scout(s) 
against submarines or small attack craft” (Murphy, 2010).  The CSBA states it could 
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work with Carrier Strike Groups or Expeditionary Strike Groups as an advance party, but 
only under the air and missile “umbrella” of the Carrier Strike Group or Expeditionary 
Strike Groups. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF MODULAR MISSION PACKAGES: PROVIDING 
FOCUSED WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY FOR THE LITTORAL COMBAT 
SHIP FROM THE NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL  
In the Development of Modular Mission Packages: Providing Focused 
Warfighting Capability for the Littoral Combat Ship, the authors convey the mission of 
the LCS and how its MPs are procured.  The importance of the modularity of the LCS 
plays directly in to the manpower associated both with the sea-frame and the modules.  
While the sea-frame houses the core crew to take the vessel to where it is needed, the 
modules are meant to execute the specific mission whether it is ASW, SUW, or MIW 
related.  These MPs and their specialties allow the sea-frame crew to concentrate on the 
sea-frame and the MP crew to concentrate on the warfare aspect. 
Richard Volkert, Carly Jackson, and Cecil Whitfield cover the LCS design and 
how the MP augments the minimally manned crew.  The LCS is designed to “operate 
more effectively in the littoral environment by providing enhanced maneuverability 
through the sea frame’s inherent ability to operate at high speeds in shallow waters” 
(Volkert, Jackson, and Whitfield, 2010).  Similar to the CSBA study, the authors give a 
background on the LCS and how it rose out of the Cold War shift from open-ocean 
fighting to littoral operations.  However, this study also recognizes that there was a 
decline in escort and mine-hunting and mine-sweeping ships.  So while there was a shift 
in large ships to small ships, there was also an absence of small ships.  Those ships that 
"survived" the downsizing were also subject to further reductions in funding.  This 
continuous decline in size and affordability ushered in a birth to an age of smaller, 
diverse ships that could be produced with a smaller price tag.   
The authors also coin the term “Systems-of-systems” (SoSs) that are made up of 
mission systems, support equipment, mission crew detachments, and aviation systems 
(Volkert, Jackson, and Whitfield, 2010).  The purpose being that when these are 
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integrated together they form the MP that delivers the different warfare capabilities to the 
sea-frame in an embarked module.     
The characteristics of the LCS were determined, and certified against hybrid 
American Bureau of Shipbuilding standards.  This resulted in the manning level being 
unfounded because of how small the sea-frame crew would be compared to other vessels 
designed in the past.  The design supported operations in high-threat areas of the littorals 
with a requirement for shallow drafts and high speed, something that could not be 
accomplished by larger vessels (Volkert, Jackson, and Whitfield, 2010).  
The authors contend that one of the primary drives to modularity was the ability 
to upgrade electronics and weapon systems independently from the sea-frame.  Typically 
on surface vessels, systems are meant to last for the duration of the ship’s life, with only 
small alterations to software.  The slow rate of change in the features results in classes of 
ships built in a 10 to 20 year timeframe are built with the same initial design 
specifications.  This is not practical in command and control, communications, and 
computer (C4) systems and weapons systems.  C4 and weapon systems are often obsolete 
by the end of the timeframe for class building.  Updating them is costly and sometimes 
impractical depending on where the ship is in its life cycle.   
The answers to these issues are in the MPs and the LCSs’ open architecture.  
When one system is needed over another, they are simply substituted out.  Maintenance, 
storage, and renovation can be accomplished ashore and does not interfere with the 
mission workload of the ship’s force. 
Moving beyond the actual “move to modularity,” the focus of the article centers 
on the actual MP and its specifications (Volkert, Jackson, and Whitfield, 2010).  The first 
portion of the MP is the Mission System (MS).  The MS is a single vehicle, 
communication, sensor, or weapon system.  It is sized to fit in International Organization 
for Standardization support containers that are ten or twenty feet.  This allows for 
simplified shipping, storage, handling, and movement. The Mission Module (MM) is a 
combination of MSs and support equipment and software.  Similar to the CSBA, the MP 
is a collection of MMs, its mission crew detachments, and Aviation Detachment.  
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Together they form the MP that has a focused mission that concentrates on SUW, ASW, 
or MIW. 
Reconfiguration of MPs occurs in homeport or inshore overseas.  The authors 
contend that these MPs will be prepositioned or available on other platforms (i.e., 
transported by air or larger vessel).  Figure 1 gives a visual representation of the process. 
 
Figure 1.  Mission Package Defined (From Volkert, Jackson, and Whitfield, 2010) 
C. GENERAL DYNAMICS INDEPENDENCE CLASS LITTORAL COMBAT 
SHIP: CAPABILITY COUNTS  
In their official brochure, General Dynamics and their LCS team lay out the 
specifics of their Independence-class design to include its principle characteristics and 
specifications (General Dynamics, 2008).  This document shows the actual complexity of 
the LCS and the state-of-the-art systems that went into its design.  For the minimal 
manning concept, it must be understood exactly what the personnel are going to be 
responsible for in daily operations. 
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The specifications of the Independence-class are centered on a trimaran hull and 
the vessel is capable of 4300 nautical miles at 18 knots without refueling.  Similar to 
the Freedom-class, the Independence-class is capable of 40+ knots.  The flight deck 
can support a H-53 or two SH-60 helicopters (which are housed onboard).  It may 
also hold an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) inventory.  The Freedom-class is also 
a multi-mission platform with a main deck and starboard Roll On / Roll Off for 
Strykers, armored Humvees, EFVs, and stern launched watercraft (General Dynamics, 
2008).  Figures 2 and 3 depict the department and capabilities, respectively, of the 
General Dynamics’ design.  
 
Figure 2.  Compartmental View of Independence-Class LCS 
 (From General Dynamics, 2008) 
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Figure 3.  Visual Depiction of Independence-Class LCS Capabilities 
(From General Dynamics, 2008) 
D. LOCKHEED MARTIN FREEDOM-CLASS LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP: 
FULL SPEED AHEAD  
The Lockheed Martin (LM) and its LCS team lay out the specifics of their 
Freedom-class design to include its mission, capabilities, interoperability, design 
features, and overall design specifications.  Similar to General Dynamics, and actually in 
a greater depth, the literature depicts not only the sea-frame and its capabilities, but also 
the MPs.  
According to LM, the mission of the Freedom-class LCS is that it is “designed to 
defeat growing littoral threats and provide assured access and dominance in coastal and 
open water” (Lockheed Martin, 2012).   
The platform capabilities are centered on a monohull frame.  The Freedom-class 
LCS defense systems include a Rolling-Airframe Missile Launching System; 57 mm 
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main gun; mine, torpedo detection; and decoy systems.  Figure 4 depicts the 
characteristics of Lockheed Martin’s design. 
 
Figure 4.  Visual Depiction of Freedom-Class Characteristics 
(From Lockheed Martin, 2012)  
The MPs center on the missions that were carried out by the three ship classes that 
the LCS is replacing.  These MPs are for both classes, with the following laid out by the 
Lockheed Martin LCS team. 
1. Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package (ASW MP):  
Provides the capability to “detect, classify, localize and prosecute enemy 
submarines” with: 
 MH-60 Romeo Helicopter with Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), 
Laser Rangefinder/ Designator (LRD), Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR), 
Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS), sonobuoys, and MK54 
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Lightweight Hybrid Torpedoes; Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (VTUAV); ASW Escort Module with towed Variable Depth 
Sonar (VDS) active source, a Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA) 
acoustic receiver, and Continuous Active Sonar (CAS) processing and 
system control; Torpedo Defense Module with an MFTA with Acoustic 
Intercept (ACI) for alertment and a Light Weight Tow (LWT) for 
countermeasures (Lockheed Martin, 2012). 
2. Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (MCM MP):  
Provides the capability to “conduct minehunting (detection, classification, 
identification and neutralization) and mine sweeping operations for mine threats” with: 
 MH-60 Sierra Helicopter; Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(VTUAV); Remote Multi-Mission Vehicles (RMMVs); AN/AQS-20A 
Mine Hunting Sonars;  Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS);  
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS); Organic Airborne and 
Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS); Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV); 
Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3); Coastal Battlefield 
Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA); Surface Mine Countermeasures 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (SMCM UUV) (Lockheed Martin, 2012). 
3. Surface Warfare Mission Package (SUW MP):  
Provides the capability to “conduct enhanced range coordinated detection, 
tracking, classification, identification and neutralization of groups of attacking, multiple, 
small boat threats and to conduct maritime security missions” with:  
 MH-60 Romeo Helicopter with eight Hellfire missiles, a .50 caliber 
machine gun, and a 7.62 mm machine gun; Vertical Takeoff Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV); Two 30 mm Gun Module that uses the MK 46 
MOD (X) Gun Weapon System with MK 44 MOD 2 30 mm Automatic 
Cannon; Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM), which will use the 
Griffin Block IIB missile for Increment I and a yet to be determined 
missile for Increment II, which will provide extended range neutralization 
capabilities; Maritime Security Module which uses two 11m Rigid Hull 
Inflatable Boats (RHIBs); Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) gear; 
two berthing modules with gear storage; and one head and shower module 
(Lockheed Martin, 2012). 
Interoperability between LCS and other assets centers on open architecture that 
allows for quick exchanges of required equipment.  This interoperability is assisted by 
COMBATSS-21 and Intelligent System Manager (ISM-X). 
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COMBATSS-21 allows for quick integration of new capabilities such as 
weapons, sensors, and communications. It is the backbone of the self-defense suite with 
integration of RADAR, electro optical/infrared cameras, gun fire control system, 
countermeasures, and short range anti-air missiles. The system is adaptable for a variety 
of ships.  Characteristics include customizable options that allow for reconfigurations 
based on specific requests by the operator.  Similar to many other features on the LCS, 
COMBATTS021 is modular, for easy-on, easy-off use (Lockheed Martin, 2012).  Figure 
5 shows the different components of COMBATSS-21 and the integration with LCS 
offensive and defensive systems. 
 
Figure 5.  COMBATSS-21 Characteristics and Components 
(From Lockheed Martin, 2012) 
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Intelligent System Manager (ISM-X) provides a fully integrated plant 
management system for engineering which include propulsion, electrical plant, 
auxiliaries, and engineering casualty/damage control systems. The ISM-X incorporates 
research from platforms past and present: DD-963, CG-47, FFG-7, DDG-51 & LCS 1 
and DDG 1000 and “employs software architecture and distributed processing to reduce 
labor and material costs of implementation, while improving overall system performance 
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III. CONTENT ANALYSIS: BREAKDOWN OF OFFICER 
MANPOWER 
Chapter III focuses on a variety of literature reviews that examine the manpower 
aspect of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the classes of ships that it is designated to 
replace.  It will define the different aspects of professional characteristics and 
occupational standards, directed and expected, to be included in the manpower for the 
officers assigned to a LCS.  Additionally, it will make comparisons to the historical 
characteristics of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class Guided Missile Frigates (FFG), Avenger-
class Mine Countermeasures ships (MCM), and Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters 
(MHC), as these are the ships that the LCS is replacing.  The Chapter will report the 
number of personnel expected to be included throughout the duration of the LCS program 
as well as the Mission Packages (MP) and all support personnel.   
A. MANUAL OF NAVY OFFICER MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL 
QUALIFICATIONS  
The Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Qualifications is the 
“principle reference manual for interpretation of coded entries on manpower and 
personnel documents and reports.”  The manual’s importance in this thesis is the 
respective definitions of the principle characteristics that are contained in a Ship 
Manpower Document (SMD).  These codes and their definitions will be a primary focus 
in the comparison of the different ship classes and their SMDs, and how their importance 
is, and needs to be, incorporated into the LCS SMD.  The rest of this literature review 
will cover the major components of the manual and define the subject areas that are 
found in the SMD.   
The Navy Officer Occupational Classification System (NOOCS) is used by the 
Navy to “identify skills, education, training, experience and capabilities related to both 
officer personnel and manpower requirements.”  The system is coded to form a 
management basis for the “procurement, training, promotion, distribution, career 
development and mobilization” of officer manpower management and officer personnel 
(Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  
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This manual is published in two volumes that explain the NOOCS codes and 
other structures.  This review will focus on volume one that contains the four subsystems 
of NOOCS:  
 The Designator (DESIG) structure identifies primary specialty 
qualifications, associated legal and specialty categories and competitive 
categories for promotion.  
 Navy Officer Billet Classifications (NOBC) functionally describes general 
occupational duties. 
 Subspecialty (SSP) identifies postgraduate education (or equivalent 
training and/or experience) in various fields and disciplines. 
 Additional Qualification Designation (AQD): identifies additional 
qualifications and skills not included in the other code structures. 
This analysis attempts to understand why the manpower requirements for each 
ship differ and how this might impact the metrics that should be used in the future.  It 
relates to manpower, what is considered the most important, and what may be 
supplemented by another source, whether it is enlisted personnel or shore support.  The 
DESIG codes for officers are important to identify because one of the objectives of this 
study is to examine the differences in the SMD across ships.  Different ship classes 
require different DESIGs based on the focus of their warfare objective.  These codes 
cover several different types of officers that are in leadership or support positions.  As 
thorough as some of the positions are, and integral to a ship's mission, they are not all 
necessarily included as a requirement for each ship.   
According to the manual, the billet and DESIG codes are categorized in general 
classifications; however, this study will focus only on Unrestricted Line, Staff Corps, 
Limited Duty, and Chief Warrant Officers.   
The Unrestricted Line (URL) Officers are those who “are not restricted in the 
performance of duty” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  The URL 
Officers are those who command ships, submarines, and squadrons.  Staff Corps (SC) 
Officers are those who directly support the URL Officers in several different roles.  Most 
importantly in the Surface Line Community, Supply Corps Officers are the logistic heads 
of the ships.  They maintain the supply onboard that feeds and clothes the officers and 
enlisted personnel.   
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When a Sailor crosses from the enlisted ranks to the officer ranks, they may 
become any type of officer depending on their education and career path.  Two types of 
officers important to this study and are in the “prior-enlisted turned officer” category are 
Limited Duty Officers (LDO) and Chief Warrant Officers (CWO).  LDOs are “appointed 
for the performance of duty in the broad occupational fields indicated by their former 
warrant designators or enlisted rating groups” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division, 2011).  LDOs begin at the rank of Ensign and work their way through the 
officer ranks much like other URL and SC officers.  However, and as noted in the 
definition, they usual stay within their occupational fields, even if in a broad manner.  An 
example of this is a prior-enlisted person who was rated as a Gunners Mate or Fire 
Controlman and commissions as an LDO, they would most likely become a Systems Test 
Officer who deals primarily with weapons related specialties.  CWOs are “appointed to 
chief warrant officer for the performance of duty in the technical fields indicated by 
former enlisted rating groups” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  As 
the definition eludes, CWOs are more technical and usually stay within their enlisted rate, 
but in an officer’s position.  An example of this would be a Sailor who was a Cryptologic 
Technician and commissioned to be a Signals Warfare Officer (SIGWO).  Although an 
officer, the SIGWO would typically oversee only other Cryptologic Technicians and not 
general members of that entire department.    
Officers are assigned DESIGs within these categories of URL, SC, LDO, and 
CWO. DESIGs are four-digit numbers that group officers in the same categories in to 
different job titles.  This is accomplished through the first three digits with the fourth 
digit usually indicating whether the officer is Active Duty or Reserve (Military Personnel 
Plans and Policy Division, 2011). For example, both Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) 
and Special Operations Officers (SO) are URL Officers.  Their designators reflect their 
differences.  SWOs are designated as 1110, and SOs are designated as 1140.  The 
difference of each is described in the definition of each designator, which will be covered 
in the following material.  
While each warfare area requires its own DESIG, each ship requires an 
assortment of DESIGs in order for the ship to perform successfully in its intended 
 22 
function.  These DESIGs, how they are implemented, and how they are assigned are 
important because they are the universal sign of what the officer's specialization.  For 
instance, a SWO is an 1110 DESIG.  Although the SWO may serve on a variety of ships 
(Destroyers, Aircraft Carriers, or Amphibious Ships) and in a variety of different billets 
(Operations Officer, Combat Systems Officer, Gunnery Officer), the officer will always 
be an 1110 DESIG.  The DESIGs in this thesis will focus on the officers found on the 
LCS and the ships that it intends to replace.   
From the Unrestricted Line Community, 1110 DESIG officers are found on all the 
ship classes.  These are the officers that make up the majority of those on board and 
include the senior officers.  The billet description calls for an “Unrestricted Line Officer 
billet requiring Surface Warfare qualification or afloat billets leading to such 
qualification” and the officer description calls for “An Unrestricted Line Officer who is 
qualified in Surface Warfare” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  
Those officers that are not yet qualified as SWOs are designated as 1160s.  Their billet 
code is defined as “Unrestricted Line Officer billet for an officer in training for Surface 
Warfare qualification” and the officer description calls for “An Unrestricted Line Officer 
who is in training for Surface Warfare qualification” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division, 2011).   
In the review of the SMDs, it is presented that the MHCs actually had officers 
assigned that were outside the normal designators on surface ships.  The Commanding 
Officer and First Lieutenant / Minesweeping Officer were qualified SOs and SOs-in-
training, 1140 and 1190, respectively.  The billet and description for 1140 is for an 
“Unrestricted Line Officer billet requiring a Special Operations officer qualification” and 
the description of that officer is “an Unrestricted Line Officer who is a Special 
Operations officer by virtue of training in the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), 
Diving/Salvage (DIV/SAL), and Expendable Ordinance Management (EOM) functional 
areas” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  The 1190 is an officer in 
training for an 1140 designation.  This difference is important to note because of the 
mission of the Minehunters, as it is alluded to in the name of the type of ship.  Also, in 
the description of the billet, there was a requirement for the officers to have an 
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understanding for what their ship was going to encounter, such as possible explosive and 
dangerous ordinance.  The Commanding Officer would have had prior training that could 
be used in tenure on the Minehunter.   
The Staff Corps designator that applies to a majority of the ships, but not the LCS, 
is for the Supply Corps.  Typically on a larger surface ship there will be a Supply Officer 
(SUPPO), Disbursing Officer, and Food Services Officer, with the SUPPO being a 
Department Head.  The billet description for the 3100 calls for a Staff Corps Officer billet 
requiring Supply specialty and the officer description simply states “a Supply Corps 
Officer”  (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011). 
Limited Duty Officers and Chief Warrant Officers also make up a small 
percentage of those found on surface ships.  They are typically assigned in engineering 
and combat systems roles.  The two LDO designations found in the SMDs for this study 
are 6130 and 6180 for engineering and electronics, respectively.  The 6130 billet 
descriptions calls for a “Limited Duty Officer (Line) billet requiring management in 
Engineering/Repair specialty (Surface)” with the officer description requiring a “Limited 
Duty Officer (Engineering/Repair - Surface)” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division, 2011).  The 6180 billet description calls for a “Limited Duty Officer (Line) 
billet requiring management in Electronics specialty (Surface)” with an explanation just 
as simple as the Engineering LDO for the Electronics LDO, “A Limited Duty Officer 
(Electronics - Surface)” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  In 
addition to the Engineering LDO, there is also an Engineering CWO with the designator 
7130.  The billet description is for a “Warrant Officer (Line) billet requiring supervision 
in Engineering specialty (Surface)” and the description as an “Engineering Technician 
(Surface)” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011). 
Following the DESIGs, the NOBCs “identify officer billet requirements and 
officer occupational experience acquired through billet experience or through a 
combination of education and experience” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 
2011).  The NOBC gives a description of general positions that will be needed on board a 
ship to “carry out missions and operations and the type of training or experience that the 
officer may have.”  The NOBC is a four-digit code where the “first digit identifies the 
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field, the second digit identifies the group within the field and the third and fourth digits 
indicate the specific billet classification within the group.”  In its application, the NOBC 
is a statement, as mentioned above, as a resource that may be used in missions and 
operations (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).   
Like the NOBC, a “Subspecialty” (SSP) is important to individual naval platform 
because it focuses on “officer requirements for advanced education, functional training, 
and significant experience in various fields and disciplines” which are tracked by the 
Navy in order to determine manpower needs and follow-on education for current officers 
and advanced education requirements for future officers (Military Personnel Plans and 
Policy Division, 2011).  These codes, like NOBCs, are applicable to all officers and are 
broken up by digit: 
 The 1st digit indicates the subspecialty Major Area. 
 The 2nd digit indicates Concentration Area. 
 The 3rd and 4th digits provide specificity  
 The suffix (5th character) indicates the level of education/ 
training/experience in the subspecialty. 
Some of the applicable SSP codes are seen on all the SMDs except for the LCS.  
This is an area for concern as this is important information when it comes to determining 
the manpower required for the platform.   
Focus is what separates the NOBCs and SSPs from the DESIG is the focus.  The 
SSP focuses on a certain aspect of a given area.  Every Surface Warfare Officer is an 
1110 DESIG, but not every Surface Warfare Officer shares the same NOBC or SSP.  
These NOBCs and SSPs are assigned based off of the type of mission, platform, or billet 
that an officer has been assigned to.  NOBCs and SSPs are trained and exist as mission 
focus areas.  This is important to the study because the LCS focuses on several different 
missions that require different specialties.   
Last, but not least, are the Additional Qualification Designations (AQD) that are 
used for specific jobs on naval platforms.  The purpose of the AQD is to “enhance billet 
and officer designator codes by identifying more specifically the qualifications required 
by a billet or a unique qualification awarded to an incumbent through service in the coded 
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billet” (Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division, 2011).  The AQD identifies these 
additional requirements and to which billets they should be incorporated with, such as the 
LF7 AQD, which is for the Tactical Action Officer (TAO), the officer that “fights the 
ship” from the Combat Information Center.  Unlike the NOBC and SSP, the AQDs are 
alpha-numeric in structure:  
 The first character identifies a broad occupational area closely related to 
the designator.  
 The second character specifies the type of qualification within the 
occupational area.  
 The third character further defines the qualification. 
AQDs are specific in nature and are dependent on where an officer is assigned 
and what type of warfare area the assignment will concentrate.  NOBCs and SSPs are a 
little broader in nature and usually pertain to a position on a ship that is coupled with a 
mission concentration of the ship.   
B. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ESTIMATED MANPOWER AND OFFICER 
OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS 
1. Littoral Combat Ship Manpower Estimate Report 
The Littoral Combat Ship Manpower Estimate Report “describes the manpower 
requirements for supporting the Littoral Combat Ship program.”  The executive summary 
provided by the Program Executive Office (PEO) states that the Manpower Estimate 
Report (MER) includes core crews, Mission Packages (MP) detachments, and required 
shore support.   
The main purpose of the sea-frame crew is to “carry out core ship functions of 
self-defense, navigation, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
(C4I)” (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 2012).  Confirmed in the MER, the core 
crew consists of forty personnel, eight officers and thirty-two enlisted personnel.  
Alternating “Blue” and “Gold” crews share time on board.  The crew embarked in the 
LCS is operational while the crew ashore is in training for their next rotation on board.  
As more LCSs become operational, the rotation will be 3:2:1, where three crews will be 
assigned to two ships with one ship deployed.  This multi-crew concept is intended to 
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support up to 16 months for the sea-frame to be deployed.  The main benefit of this type 
of rotation is that it will allow for the sea-frame to spend more time at sea and in 
operation.  It also benefits the crews because it gives them a period on shore where they 
can accomplish administrative and training necessities such as personnel transfers and 
rate specific education.  
In addition to the sea-frame crew, an LCS will deploy and operate with the 
embarked MPs consisting of a nineteen person Mission Module (MM) and an Aviation 
Detachment of twenty-three personnel.  When ashore, a shore support detachment will 
contain all the personnel required for the ship and MMs; which will include 
administrative, logistic, training and maintenance support.  The coordination between the 
LCS and shore support will be completed through the LCS Squadron (LCSRON) and the 
Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC).  The Maintenance Support Team (MST), 
Logistics Support Team (LST) and Mission Package Support Facility (MPSF) will 
conduct maintenance (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 2012).  
The MER’s executive summary concludes that for the 55-ship / 64-MM LCS 
class, that there will be 4904 people to operate, 3386 people for maintenance, 862 people 
for support, and 1098 people for training (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 
2012).   
Following the Executive Summary, the MER breaks down the unique features of 
the MPs and shore support.  These facts and figures are crucial because they are what 
dictate the minimal manning of the LCS sea-frame crew, as well as the status of the LCS 
in readiness.  
The MP procurement is, and will continue to be, an incremental acquisition that 
allows for delivery of already existing systems to be used as soon as they are ready. 
Remaining systems (referred to as increments) will be brought online as they are 
completed in development.  According to the MER, the MP Baseline is “Full Capability” 
when the Mine Countermeasures Mission MP is Increment 4, the Surface Warfare MP is 
Increment 4, and the Anti-Submarine Warfare MP is Increment 2 (Program Manager, 
Littoral Combat Ship, 2012).   
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The Mine Countermeasures Mission Package Systems is broken down in to the 
following increments: 
 Increment 1: Capability for the detection and neutralization of volume 
and bottom mines with the use of AQS-20 mine-hunting SONAR, Remote 
Mine-hunting System (RMS), Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 
(ALMDS), and Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS). 
 Increment 2: Inshore detection capability with the Coastal Battlefield 
Recon and Analysis (COBRA) system. 
 Increment 3: Neutralize near surface and floating mines with use of 
Surface Mine Counter-measures (SMCM) Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
(UUV) with Low Frequency Broad Band (LFBB) and Increased AMNS 
capability 
 Increment 4: Not described 
The Surface Warfare Mission Packages/Systems is broken down in to the 
following increments: 
 Increment 1: Counter small boat threats with 30mm Gun Mission Module 
(GMM) 
 Increment 2: support for Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) or 
Irregular Warfare with additional Maritime Security Module (MSM) that 
includes berthing, small boats, and support equipment. 
 Increment 3: Irregular Warfare Module (IWM) that will include medical 
trauma unit manned by Naval Hospital personnel with additional 
capability of Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM). 
 Increment 4: Delivery of SSMM missiles 
The Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package/Systems is broken down in to the 
following increments: 
 Increment 1: Capability to detect, classify, and localize enemy 
submarines (delivered in 2008, placed in lay-up until further development 
of MP). 
 Increment 2: Bi-static capability using Continuous Active Sonar Variable 
Depth Sonar (CAS VDS) and separate Multi-Function Towed Array 
(MFTA), Light Weight Tow (LWT) Torpedo countermeasures. 
The shore support concept covers functions usually performed by crew will be 
handled by shore-assigned personnel.  This includes administrative duties and supply.  
LSTs and MSTs will carry out the majority of the maintenance.   
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The LSTs perform work typically carried out by ship’s Supply Department.  
LCSRON will work with LST for logistics, to include Logistic Requests (LOGREQs) 
which are used to request certain materials when ships require them.  The LST will 
operate out of Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP).  NAVSUP will be the 
single point of contact for the core crew Supply Officer.  Keep in mind that there is no 
Supply Officer on board an LCS, so a core crew Supply Officer will act on behalf of the 
LCS.  This core crew Supply Officer will be assigned ashore and assist with the 
coordination of logistics.  The implication of this is that major logistical issues will be 
dealt with when the sea-frame is in port; issues arising at sea will be dealt with through 
available means such as on board inventory and what can be procured through 
LOGREQs and delivered via underway replenishments.  The LST Officer-in-Charge 
(OIC) will work between LCSRON and NAVSUP by reporting to LCSRON for 
operations and to NAVSUP for administrative and manning requirements. 
The MST plans the LCS maintenance phases that range from initial planning to 
delivery of the vessel.  They conduct maintenance both in and outside of the United 
States using “fly-away” teams for OCONUS operations.  The planning is conducted by 
the Maintenance Review Board (MRB) which sets “priorities and strategies for 
maintenance and sustainment” (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 2012).  It is an 
evolved for of Planning Board for Maintenance (PB4M) which takes places between the 
ship and MST.  For the MPs, the Mission Package Support Facility works in conjunction 
with the MST OIC. 
When the ship is not in its homeport, maintenance afloat must be completed by 
ship’s force and embarked personnel for the MM.  Since the LCS is minimally manned, 
non-critical work will be deferred or emergent repair provided when Distance Support is 
exhausted.  Other than that, Preventive Maintenance (PM) and Corrective Maintenance 
(CM) are to be completed as scheduled.  The PM schedule is made by the ship’s 
Maintenance Material Management Coordinator (3MC) which revolves around the sea-
shore rotation and crew.  MM PM is restricted to less than monthly checks lasting only 
two hours. The CM for Ship’s Force is limited to troubleshooting and modular 
replacement of mission critical systems.   
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When a ship’s crew is not conducting maintenance, they are most likely training.  
The training concepts for the Sailors of the LCS are both focused on common 
requirements for all Sailors, as well as tailored requirements specific to LCS.  
Additionally, Sailors on board the LCS must be interchangeable with other Sailors on 
other LCS platforms.  What this equates to is that each billet has the “same requirements 
for Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) as the corresponding billet on any other 
crew within the same LCS Hull Type or MM detachment” (Program Manager, Littoral 
Combat Ship, 2012).  While most personnel report to ships ready to serve, they must 
first be oriented to the platform and trained in specific requirements.  What this means 
for LCS Sailors is that they must report to the ship ready to stand watch and fulfill 
their duties as they attend a training pipeline for the LCS before ever even setting foot 
on a LCS.  
The LCS training process involves Train to Qualify and Train to Certify.  Train to 
Qualify (T2Q) focuses on the individual and is the process of training in an off-ship 
environment.  Train to Certify (T2C) focuses on the watch team and it is the process of 
training, both on and off-ship, a watch team (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 
2012).  
The off-ship training is collaboration between the Afloat Training Group (ATG) 
and LCSRON.  This collaboration is meant to follow a crew from beginning to end of a 
training and deployment cycle.  ATG focuses on the whole crew while each LCS Sailor, 
prior to reporting to the crew, is assigned a standard training syllabus.  This is billet 
specific training and takes place at the LCS Training Facility (LTF) and supports T2Q.  
Once completed and qualified, the Sailor joins the crew during off-hull time.  The MM 
training for its respective Sailors is modeled after the ship training method.   
Moving past maintenance and training, the MER covers the actual manpower 
estimation, beginning with the sea-frame. 
The following will focus on the “Sea-frame Projected Student Throughput for 
Officer Personnel” for LCS crews (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 2012).  An 
officer’s tenure on board will last anywhere from one and a half to two years.  This 
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reflects half of total officer populations.  The Commanding Officer and Operations 
Officer are not included as they will be relieved by fleet up personnel (i.e., The 
Commanding Officer begins the tour as the Executive Officer and fleets up to the 
Commanding Officer position). This period of time does not include the initial 
training that LCS officers will complete prior to their counter starting for their time on 
board LCS.   
According to the MER, the steady state for officers will be reached in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 31.  At this time there will be 249 relief officers.  This number is reached by 
multiplying the number of officer relief required (Six, since the OPS and CO are not 
included) by the number of crews required two years prior to the date.  This number is 
then divided by two ([6 officer reliefs (OPS and CO not included) x Number of Crew 2 
years before] / 2). 
This steady state will require 152 training man years.  This number was 
ascertained by multiplying the total number of students in a given year by the average 
length of the training pipeline, which is .61 years for officers and does not include 
Department Head School, but does include the LCS pipeline.   
Similar to the sea-frame, the “Mission Module Project Student Throughput for 
Officer Personnel” covers the one officer that is assigned to a module as the OIC for the 
detachment (Program Manager, Littoral Combat Ship, 2012).  According to the MER, the 
steady state for the OIC officer will be reached in FY26 with 64 officers for 64 modules.  
This will consist of 43 training man years with the breakdown of training per module as 
follows: MCM: .58 years; ASW: .94 years; and SUW: .60 years, which includes 54 days 
for Visit Board Search and Seizure schooling.  These numbers also reflect officers 
reporting to active crews, not crews on Pre-Commissioning Units. 
To get a better sense of what the sea-frame and module steady states consist of in 
relations to the actual sea-frame and module deliveries, the MER lays out the following 
for expected delivery of the final sea-frames and modules. 
The hull delivery schedule dictates that the 55th ship to be delivered in FY35.  
Lockheed Martin's accountability for twenty-seven hulls, requiring forty-one crews, will 
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be reached in FY29.  General Dynamics’ accountability for twenty-eight hulls, requiring 
forty-two crews, will also be reached in FY29.  The first four ships already in 
commission or construction are manned under the Blue/Gold concept as previously 
mentioned.  The follow-on hulls will be manned with the 3:2:1 set-up where three crews 
will be assigned to two sea-frames with one sea-frame deployed.  The crews are funded 
or “bought” a year in advance for training and familiarization which is even further in 
advance that required by T2Q.  
The Mission Module delivery follows a delivery that pairs with the delivery of the 
sea-frames.  Similar to the crews, the modules will have a 3:2 ratio, 3 crews for every 2 
modules.  The steady state for SUW is to be reached in FY24 with 24 MM and 36 crew 
detachments.  The steady state for MIW is to be reached in FY25 with 24 MM and 36 
crew detachments.  The steady state for ASW is also FY25 with 16 MM and 24 crew 
detachments.   
Regarding manpower, the core crew will have billets bought with time determined 
for pipeline training.  The steady state is expected to be reached in FY28 with 664 
officers capable of 83 crews for 55 hulls.   
The MER prescribes the layout for ship and module maintenance, as well as shore 
support: 
 Ship Maintenance: Steady State in FY29 with 14 officers (1 per every 4 
ships).  These officers will be complemented by 224 civilian personnel 
and 2846 contractor personnel, with 0 enlisted personnel. 
 Mission Module Maintenance: Steady state of only 2 officers beginning in 
FY17, one per Coast. Each officer will have an enlisted representative and 
they will be complemented by 298 civilian personnel. 
 Shore Support: The non-training portion of LCSRON is expected to have 
151 officers by FY28 with the total staff being 636.  Keep in mind that a 
Destroyer Squadron staff is only 29.  The training portion is expected to 
have 96 officers with a total staff of 1098. 
2. Littoral Combat Ship Austal LCS 2 Hull Type Preliminary Ship 
Manpower Document 
The Littoral Combat Ship Austal LCS 2 Hull Type Preliminary Ship Manpower 
Document provides the layout of the core personnel of the sea-frame.  The importance of 
 32 
this document is that the manpower assessment contained within it is the assigned 
number of personnel that will initially man the LCS to make it an operational asset.  As a 
Preliminary Ship Manpower Document (PSMD), these numbers are meant to be revised 
and result in a Ship’s Manpower Document (SMD), something that has yet to occur.  
While focusing on only the officers, and when compared to the ship types it replaced, it 
will be noticed that certain NOBCs and other qualifications are not included.  These 
NOBCs or qualifications have either been reassigned to enlisted personnel, or not 
included in the description for the manpower required.  
Each officer will have certain designations and qualifications that make them an 
integral part of the LCS mission.  The officers assigned are all designated 1110, with the 
exception of the Chief Engineer who is designated as 6130. The 1110 designation is for 
URL SWOs and the 6130 is for LDOs with an engineering background.  
Table 1 shows the breakdown of officers assigned to the LCS, as per the PSMD.  
It should be noted that the only requirements contained are those for designators and 
NOBCs (Program Executive Office, 2012). 
 
Table 1.   LCS Officer DESIGs and NOBCs (After PEO, 2012) 
The following is a breakdown of the officers and the NOBCs they will be required 
to hold when being assigned to the LCS, as defined by the Manual of Navy Officer 
Manpower and Personnel Qualifications.  These definitions are verbatim as they appear 
in the manual.  Following their explanations, it will be shown how these are the bare 
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minimum requirements set forth in the PSMD.  The SMD’s of the ship classes that the 
LCS is set to replace are far more robust and inclusive of professional characteristics. 
a. Commanding Officer: NOBC 9235 
Commands, in a commander billet, a ship or unit of the operating forces in 
accordance with regulations, orders, traditions and customs of the service 
(p. C-29). 
b. Executive Officer: NOBC 9228, Executive Officer Afloat 
Administers the organization, performance of duty and good order and 
discipline of a ship or unit of the operating forces. Acts as direct 
representative of commanding officer, enforcing command orders and 
policies, assisting in command operations, and commanding in his 
absence. Coordinates with department heads for command administration, 
schedules and inspections, and personnel performance, training, welfare, 
and morale (p. C-29). 
c. Operations Officer: NOBC 9275, Operations Officer, Afloat 
(Naval Tactical Data Systems) 
Coordinates ship’s operations, training and tactical planning. Organizes 
operations department and delegates responsibilities for communications, 
Combat Information Center (CIC) and sonar activities. Confers 
periodically with commanding officer and department heads in preparation 
of ship's operation plans and training schedules. Conducts briefings. 
Directs underwater, surface and air searches and electronic 
countermeasures. Evaluates and disseminates operational information, 
advising command on required tactics and ship movements and 
controlling airborne aircraft through CIC officer. Supervises electronic 
equipment repair (p. C-102). 
d. Combat Systems Officer: NOBC 9261 
Directs activities of ship’s combat system’s department. Advises 
commanding officer on combat system’s operations, capabilities and 
problems. Oversees operation and operational maintenance of all weapons 
and combat systems control equipment. Coordinates the conduct of 
shipboard combat system’s test and evaluation matters. Supervises care, 
handling, stowage and use of explosives (p. C-101). 
e. Combat Information Center Officer: NOBC 9217  
Directs Naval Tactical Data System-Combat Information Center (NTDS-
CIC) teams. Supervises operators of NTDS-CIC equipment including 
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radar, sonar, electronic countermeasures (ECM) and communication 
equipment in collection, display, evaluation and dissemination of 
information. Performs NTDS-CIC watchstanding duties. Executes combat 
direction decisions. Operates NTDS consoles. Notifies control stations of 
pertinent CIC information. Controls airborne aircraft. Coordinates search 
and rescue. Controls small craft. Assists with special operations requiring 
CIC information. Corrects tactical computer programs (p. C-98). 
f. Electronic Material Officer: NOBC 9283 
Administers maintenance and allowance of shipboard electronic 
equipment. Interprets and carries out systems commands or 
manufacturers’ instructions for equipment, establishing maintenance 
standards and ensuring readiness. Diagnoses causes of malfunctions and 
directs repair, modification, alteration and installation of equipment. 
Directs requisitioning of spare parts and gear. Directs preparation and 
submittal of work requests, reports and informative data required for 
tender/yard overhaul of electronic equipment (p. C-102). 
g. Chief Engineer: NOBC 9364 
Administers ship’s engineering department. Directs operation and 
maintenance of propulsion and auxiliary machinery and electric power 
equipment. Superintends engineroom, boilerrooms, carpenter shop and 
electrical and other engineering spaces. Directs maintenance of boat 
machinery, control of damage, repair of hull and appurtenances and 
repairs not specifically assigned to other departments. Directs procurement 
and use of fuel, lubricants, spare parts and other engineering equipage. 
Maintains comprehensive maintenance program. Directs preparation of 
required engineering records and reports (p. C-106). 
h. Main Propulsion Assistant: NOBC 9336 
Assists ship’s engineering officer by directing operations and maintenance 
of main propulsion equipment, including turbogenerators and auxiliary 
powerplants. Establishes routine and directs operation of machinery.  
Diagnoses malfunctions and directs maintenance and repair. Maintains 
fuel consumption records. Operates main engine-room control board, 
ensuring that men are on station, that telephone contact with bridge is 
clear and that main engines are in readiness for orders. Reviews logs and 




Figure 6 shows a breakdown of the officer and crew for the LCS.  Similar to other 
surface ships, the CO, XO, and Senior Enlisted Leader do not belong to a specific 
department.  However, each department only has two officer, where many surface ships 




Figure 6.  LCS Sea-frame Chain of Command (After PEO, 2012) 
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C. OFFICER MANPOWER AND OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FFG, MCM, AND MHC SHIP CLASSES 
1. Ship Manpower Document (SMD) for FFG 7 Class  
The Ship Manpower Document for FFG 7 Class provides the layout for the 
personnel on the Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG platform.  This is the largest platform 
that the LCS is set to replace.  Notably, the officer concept contains more manpower and 
a wider variety of qualifications and requirements.  Additionally, those officer billets that 
are present on both LCS and FFG (i.e., Operations Officer and Combat Systems Officer) 
have different requirements.  While this looks at manning and manpower it can be 
ascertained from SMD comparisons that the FFG SMD contains additional DESIGs, 
NOBCs, as well as SSPs and AQD codes.  
While the core officer crew of the LCS is eight, the FFG has seventeen officers 
with multiple DESIGs.  In addition to 1110 and 7130 DESIGs found on LCS, the FFGs 
also have 1160 designated officers that are Non-Qualified SWOs; a 6180 DESIG officer 
who is a LDO with an electronics specialty; a 7130 DESIG CWO with an engineering 
specialty; and Supply Officers that carry the 3100 designator.  
Table 2 shows the breakdown of officers assigned to the FFG, as per the SMD.  
This SMD is much more robust as it contains not only designators and NOBCs, but also 
SSPs and AQDs (Navy Manpower Analysis Center, 2008).  
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Table 2.   FFG Officer DESIGs, NOBCs, SSPS, and AQDs 
(After NAVMAC, 2008) 
The following is the breakdown of the FFG SMD and how it differs from the 
LCS.  Similarly, definitions for DESIGs, NOBCs, SSPs, and AQDs are sourced from the 
Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Qualifications.  The importance of 
these differences showcases the change from the FFG platform and its requirements to 
the LCS platform and their respective requirements.   
Commanding Officer (CO): The CO’s NOBC of 9235 is the same as the LCS 
CO, however, it is defined in the FFG SMD that the FFG CO will also carry the 6301 
SSP for Undersea Warfare.  For the LCS, an embarked Undersea Warfare module is 
expected to cover this requirement, again returning to the fact that the LCS crew is 
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responsible for the sea-frame, and not necessarily, the manpower requirements for a 
mission.  However, the exact specifics of the module manpower are yet to be published.   
Executive Officer (XO): The XO’s NOBC of 9228 is the same as the LCS XO.  
However, the FFG XO also holds a second NOBC of 9284 which is for the Ship’s 
Navigator who:  
Directs activities of navigation department. Maintains accurate plot of 
ship’s position by means of celestial navigation, piloting, electronic 
devices and navigational tables and formulas. Establishes ship’s position 
in pilot waters by fathometer readings and ranges and bearings on land 
objects. Operates Loran, radio direction finder and fathometer. Evaluates 
radar data in determining ranges and bearings. Advises commanding 
officer of course and location. Plots course to be steered. Maintains all 
navigation equipment (p. C-99).  
Training Officer (TRAINO): The TRAINO NOBC of 3292 is not contained in 
the LCS PSMD.  This is a position that is to be covered by the support staff (LCS 
Squadron) to the LCS platforms.  The LCS Squadron will theoretically plan the training 
requirements typically coordinated by the Training Officer, which include:  
Coordinating a comprehensive shipboard/squadron training program and 
de-conflicts training requirements during Planning Board for Training. 
Trains and supervises all department/division training coordinators. 
Develops and maintains Required Schools Master List. Actively liaisons 
with off-ship training providers, in particular, the AFLOATRAGRU 
Training Liaison Officer. Coordinates training orders, student clearances 
and training TADTAR budget. Reports ship/squadron training status using 
the Status of Resources and Training System (p. C-44). 
Operations Officer (OPS): The FFG OPS requires the NOBC of 9274 that is the 
General, Operations Officer, Afloat code.  The LCS OPS requires the NOBC of 9275.  
The difference being that the 9275 is Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) and 9274 is 
not.  However, the FFG SMD requires the OPS to have the AQD of LF7 which is for the 




Navigator (NAV): As explained above, this NOBC of 9284 is for the ship’s 
navigation.  The NAV will be responsible for the majority of navigational evolutions, 
with the XO as a supervisor and the CO being ultimately responsible for the safe 
navigation of the ship.  
Communications Officer (COMMO): The COMMO is an Ensign and non-
qualified Surface Warfare Officer.  Generally, these are officers that have just 
commissioned out of college or Officer Candidate School, or enlisted personnel who 
have gone through a commissioning process.  As it is explained, this non-qualified officer 
is required to obtain multiple billet specific qualifications, even when junior to the rest of 
the officer corps on the FFG. 
Primary NOBC: 9582, as Information Systems Officer:  
Directs communication activities of command. Supervises security of 
classified information; operation security (OPSEC/COMSEC), 
administrative directives, communications management, and organization, 
signals officer management, and organization; message drafting and 
communications equipment, and systems (conventional, automated and 
satellite). Information Systems Officer manages all information exchange 
systems external to the command (p. C-113). 
Secondary NOBC: 9535, as Custodian of CMS Material:  
Serves as custodian of Communications Security Material System (CMS) 
material distributed to command or activity. Procures material in 
accordance with allowance list, maintaining secure stowage. Makes, or 
supervises making of, corrections as required by appropriate directives. 
Reissues material on local custody as necessary. Takes periodic 
inventories. Disposes of material as authorized or directed. Reports any 
actual or suspected loss or compromise (p. C-112). 
The COMMO also holds the VX1 AQD:   
Foundation for naval C4 expertise development. Provides experience in 
operational naval C4 to include tactical and strategic C4, LANS/WANS, 
data base management, GCCS, JMCIS, software development, and 
information architectures. Code is assigned to officer after completion of 1 
year in this qualifying billet (p. D-207). 
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Combat Information Center Officer (CICO):  The FFG CICO holds the same 
NOBC (9217) as the LCS CICO.  However, the FFG CICO also holds a secondary 
NOBC of 9640 (Operational Intelligence Officer) which entails the following:  
Supervises the collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence of 
tactical and strategic value in naval and/or joint operations. Supervises the 
intelligence input to target programs and provides advice on mission 
planning and weapon selection. Supervises the preparation of intelligence 
estimates and intelligence annexes to operation orders and plans. 
Supervises maintenance of the order of battle information, intelligence 
plots and data handling systems. Supervises the production of intelligence 
reports. Coordinates reconnaissance missions and interrogations of 
prisoners (p. C-115). 
Combat Systems Officer (CSO):  Similar to the FFG OPS, the FFG CSO holds 
the same primary NOBC (9261) as the LCS OPS.  Also similar to the FFG OPS, the FFG 
CSO has several additional duties that include a subspecialty and an AQD.  The 
subspecialty is 5700S which requires significant experience in Combat Systems and the 
AQD of LF7 for TAO. 
Gunnery Officer (GUNNO): The GUNNO is an 1160, non-qualified SWO that 
holds the NOBC of 9202:  
Assists weapons officer by directing all gunnery/ordnance activities. 
Directs employment, operation and maintenance of all gunnery equipment 
and related fire control equipment. Directs procurement, handling, 
stowage and restowage, maintenance and issue of ammunition. As 
appropriate, provides conventional and guided missile aviation ordnance 
to embarked carrier air wing. Ensures operational readiness of personnel 
and equipment. Enforces safety regulations (p. C-97). 
Electronic Materials Officer (EMO):  The EMO on both the FFG and LCS hold 
the NOBC of 9283.  The EMO is a 6180 designated officer who is a LDO with an 
electronics specialty.  Additionally, the FFG EMO holds the VX1 AQD that the 
COMMO also holds. 
Anti-Submarine Weapons Officer (ASWO): Considering the primary mission 
of the FFG is Undersea Warfare, it is no surprise that there is a specific officer assigned 
to that warfare area.  It is surprising that the officer is an 1160, a non-qualified SWO.  
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However, this position, and its NOBC, is not contained in the LCS PSMD for Officers.  
The NOBC of 9206 entails the following:  
Directs employment, operation and maintenance of all weapons 
department antisubmarine (A/S) equipment. Conducts underwater A/S 
search and attack. Directs operation, care and maintenance of all A/S 
equipment, including search and attack sonar, fire control equipment, 
weapons, assorted ordnance, attack aids, torpedo countermeasures and 
underwater communications equipment used in identification and 
classification of submarines (p. C-97). 
Chief Engineer (CHENG): The FFG CHENG holds the same 9364 NOBC as the 
LCS CHENG.  However, and similar to the FFG Department Head counterparts of OPS 
and CSO, the CHENG holds a SSP of  5600S requiring significant experience in General 
Mechanical Engineering and the LF7 AQD for TAO.  
Auxiliary Officer (AUXO): The AUXO on the FFG is a Second Tour Division 
Officer and a qualified SWO.  The AUXO holds the NOBC of 9302:  
Administers ship’s engineering division in operations and maintenance of 
heating and air-conditioning equipment, diesel engines, boat engines, and 
electrohydraulic and other auxiliary machinery. Establishes and maintains 
standards and procedures for operating and maintaining machinery and 
equipment. Investigates causes of equipment malfunctions and determines 
methods of repair of unusual or difficult cases. Initiates requisitioning of 
repair parts and fuel for auxiliaries. Supervises preparation of machinery 
logs and records (p. C-104). 
Damage Control Assistant (DCA): The DCA holds the 9308 NOBC, which is 
not present on the LCS and entails the following:  
Plans and directs shipboard damage control activities. Directs all actions 
required to maintain watertight integrity, stability, mobility and 
maneuverability and control of list, trim and draft. Evaluates potential 
hazards and takes necessary action to minimize them, placing special 
emphasis on fire and explosion prevention. Establishes escape systems and 
personnel rescue procedures. Directs confinement and extinguishment of 
fires, including dewatering operations and ventilation control. 
Accomplishes rapid repairs (p. C-104). 
Main Propulsion Assistant (MPA):  The FFG MPA and LCS MPA hold the 
NOBC of 9337 (Gas Turbine) and 9336 (Diesel), respectively.  The definition of the 
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NOBC is the same.  However, the most notable difference is that the FFG MPA is a 
LDO and the LCS MPA is an 1110 SWO.  
The following two billets for the FFG are not found on the LCS PSMD.  The 
billets for Supply Department on the LCS are only included in the enlisted section and 
are to be augmented by onshore support. 
Supply Officer (SUPPO): NOBC 1918 
Directs supply department activities. Applies supply policies to operation 
of department. Determines demand in accordance with mission and 
standard allowance lists. Approves requisitions, balance sheets and 
summaries. Directs receiving, storage, inventory control, issue and salvage 
of material. Oversees procurement and sale of goods and services. 
Administers operation of general mess, including procurement, storage, 
issue and inventory of provisions. Conducts disbursing activities in 
connection with property accountability and transfer, payroll and personal 
accounts.  The SUPPO also holds the 1300 subspecialty for material 
distribution (p. C-23). 
Disbursing Officer (DISBO): NOBC 1045 
Directs procurement, custody, transfer and issue of funds for payrolls and 
allowances. Issues savings bonds on payroll deductions. Prepares military 
pay records and makes payments to military and civilian payrolls. 
Prepares and pays public vouchers. Receives collections for credit to 
appropriations and other accounts. Maintains accountability for United 
States Treasury checks. Issues transportation requests. Prepares required 
financial returns and special reports. Assists in installation of new 
disbursing procedures (p. C-19). 
Table 3 takes the differences between the LCS PSMD and the FFG SMD.  The 
major differences, which will be seen in the MCM and MHC SMDs as well, are the 
additional requirements that are assigned to the billets for each officer.  Some of the 
requirements are vital for the ship’s mission, such as the 6301 SSP for Undersea Warfare 
found on the FFG SMD.  This SSP, along with several NOBCs, other SSPs, and AQDs 
are recommended to be included on the final SMD for the LCS because of their 
importance to the ship class and the manpower assigned to it. 
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Table 3.   Compared Occupational Standards Between LCS and FFG 
 (After NAVMAC, 2008)  
2. Ship Manpower Document for the Avenger-class Mine 
Countermeasure (MCM) Ship 
The SMD for the Avenger-class MCMs provides the layout for the personnel 
assigned to the MCM platform.  Similar to the mission of the FFGs, the MCM mission is 
set to be replaced by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  While the FFG concentrated more 
on ASW, the MCM, as the name implies, is for MIW.  Accordingly, some officer billets 
will entail different characteristics than that of the FFG or LCS.   
The following is the breakdown of the MCM SMD and how it differs from the 
LCS.  Similarly, definitions for DESIGs, NOBCs, sub-specialties, and AQDs are sourced 
from the Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Qualifications.  The 
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importance of these differences is to show the change from the MCM platform and its 
requirements to the LCS platform and its requirements. 
Table 4 shows the breakdown of officers assigned to the MCM, as per the SMD 
(Navy Manpower Analysis Center, 2011).  The LCS officer corps is smaller than the FFG 
and the MCM.  The MCM requirements include additional NOBCs, SSPs and AQDs.  
The number of officers is much closer to that of the LCS, which shows that with 
smaller/minimal manning, it is important to have thorough requirements. 
 
Table 4.   MCM Officer DESIGs, NOBCs, SSPs, and AQDs 
(After NAVMAC, 2011) 
Commanding Officer (CO):  The CO’s NOBC of 9234 is the same as the LCS, 
with the only difference being that the MCM CO is a Lieutenant Commander (O-4), 
wherein the LCS CO is a Commander (O-5).  
Executive Officer (XO): The MCM XO holds the same NOBC (9228) as the 
LCS XO.  Additionally, the MCM XO holds the VX2 AQD which entails the following: 
Mid-management operations or staff position in a naval C4 billet on fleet, numbered 
fleet, battle group staff, ship/squadron, or NCTAMS that requires an officer with the VX1 
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code. Officer is coded upon successful completion of 1 or more years in this qualifying 
billet. 
Operations Officer (OPS):  The MCM OPS holds the NOBC code 9274 which 
is for Non-Naval Tactical Data Systems (Non-NTDS), while the LCS OPS holds the 
9275 which is for Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS).  Largely, the definition for the 
NOBC remains the same.  Also of note, the MCM and FFG OPS hold the same NOBC.  
Similar to the FFG OPS, the MCM OPS holds a sub-specialty and an AQD.  The sub-
specialty is 6201S for significant experience in “Information Systems and Technology” 
and the AQD is VX1 for Tactical Action Officer (TAO). 
Ship’s Navigator (NAV):  Although not included in the LCS PSMD, the MCM 
NAV holds the same NOBC (9284) as the FFG NAV.  
Combat Information Center Officer (CICO):  The MCM CICO holds the 
NOBC 9216, which is different than the LCS CICO NOBC 9217 when it comes to Non-
NTDS and NTDS systems:  
Directs collection, display, evaluation, and dissemination of operational 
and combat information. Supervises Combat Information Center (CIC) 
personnel operating radar, sonar, electronic countermeasures, 
communication, and plotting equipment. Provides information to control 
stations regarding navigation, movement of friendly and enemy ships and 
aircraft, and current combat information. Directs the care, operation and 
maintenance of CIC equipment. Assists in target designation, piloting, 
antisubmarine operations and tactical deception (p. C-98). 
First Lieutenant (1
st
) / Minesweeping (Sweep): This position includes some of 
the most focused requirements when it comes to the mission of the MCM, deck work and 
minesweeping.  These two concentrations would account for a significant portion of the 
operations to take place on the MCM.  The Officer-In-Charge of these operations, for the 
MCM, is a non-qualified Surface Warfare Officer, Ensign.  Similar to the 
Communications Officer described in the FFG SMD review, this officer is also fresh to 
report to the MCM, but is also responsible for the “bread and butter” of the MCM 
mission.  The NOBC code 9242 for the 1st billet entails the following: 
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Supervises deck force in performance of seamanship functions and 
evolutions. Prepares work schedules. Directs mooring, docking, 
anchoring, fueling, towing and transferring of personnel and cargo at sea. 
Directs operation and maintenance of deck machinery. Arranges for cargo 
handling. Assigns boats and boat crews. Maintains readiness of boats and 
survival equipage. Directs cleaning and preservation of weather decks, 
ship’s exterior, running gear, ground tackle and boatswain’s stores. 
Approves watch, quarter and station assignments (p. C-100).   
Additionally, the secondary NOBC code (9268) for the Minesweeping Officer 
description is:  
Directs operation and afloat maintenance of minesweeping and 
minehunting equipment including magnetic, high-speed, moored and 
acoustic gear. Directs minesweeping and minehunting personnel, 
including explosive ordnance disposal personnel. Controls streaming, 
energizing and recovery of gear, observing safety precautions. 
Reconstructs plot of swept area and supervises planting of buoys. Directs 
use of non-sweeping mine countermeasures techniques. Schedules 
maintenance and repair of gear (p. C-101).   
Chief Engineer (CHENG):  Similar to the LCS, the CHENG is a 6130 
designated Limited Duty Officer and holds the NOBC code of 9363 (Diesel): 
Administers ship's engineering department. Directs operation and 
maintenance of propulsion and auxiliary machinery and electric power 
equipment. Superintends engineroom, boilerrooms, carpenter shop and 
electrical and other engineering spaces. Directs maintenance of boat 
machinery, control of damage, repair of hull and appurtenances and 
repairs not specifically assigned to other departments. Directs procurement 
and use of fuel, lubricants, spare parts and other engineering equipage. 
Maintains comprehensive maintenance program. Directs preparation of 
required engineering records and reports (p. C-106). 
Damage Control Assistant (DCA):  The DCA holds the NOBC code 9308 
which is the same as the FFG DCA.  Again, the DCA is not an officer billet on LCS.  
Supply Officer (SUPPO):  The MCM SUPPO holds the NOBC code of 1918.  
Like the DCA billet, this code is the same as the FFG SUPPO and is not an officer billet 
on the LCS. 
Table 5 takes the differences between the LCS PSMD and the MCM SMD.  The 
major differences, similar to the FFG SMDs, are the additional requirements, the most 
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notable quite possibly being the NOBCs for the 1st/SWEEP. These two NOBCs, 9242 
and 9268, deal directly with Mine Warfare and the support of it.  These are the types of 
requirements that could be included on the LCS SMD and expected of the officers 
assigned to the LCS.  
 
Table 5.   Compared Occupational Standards Between LCS and MCM 
(After NAVMAC, 2011)  
3. Ship Manpower Document for the Osprey-class Coastal Minehunter 
The Osprey-class MHCs are the first class of ship to be commissioned that the 
LCS is set to replace.  The ship was the smallest of these ships and contained the 
smallest, yet possibly most diverse crew.  The SMD for the MHC portrays the 
adaptability sought for a specific-mission themed ship, with its concentration on Mine 
Warfare.  The following notes will cover the MHCs comparison to the LCS, but may also 
contain reference to the FFG and MCM vessels.  Definitions for DESIGs, NOBCs, SSPs, 
and AQDs are sourced from the Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel 
Qualifications.   
Table 6 shows the breakdown of officers assigned to the MHC, as per the SMD 
(Navy Manpower Analysis Center, 2000).  The MHC had a smaller officer corps than the 
FFG, MCM, or LCS, and was tasked with the extremely important mission of locating 
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mines.  Without knowing the location of mines and/or minefields, other ships would be 
unable to maneuver, let alone operate in their mission function area.  This aspect alone 
made them a crucial component to large-scale operations involving the rest of the surface 
fleet.  
 
Table 6.   MHC Officer DESIGs, NOBCs, SSPs, and AQDs 
(After NAVMAC, 2000) 
Commanding Officer (CO):  The CO for the MHC is quite different from not 
only the LCS, but also from the FFG and MCM.  The designator calls for a 1140, which 
is a qualified Special Operations Officer (an Unrestricted Line Officer who is a Special 
Operations Officer by virtue of training in the EOD, DIV/SAL, and EOM functional 
areas), versus the typical 1110 that is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer.  However, this 
only applied for half of the MHC class.  Hulls 51 through 56 were with 1140 designated 
COs and hulls 57 through 62 were 1110 designated Surface Warfare Officers.  Beyond 
the designator, the NOBC code of 9234 is the same for MHCs and MCMs, and only 
differs from LCS and FFG in the fact that the CO is a Lieutenant Commander (O-4), vice 
a Commander (O-5).   
Executive Officer (XO):  The XO carries the same NOBC code as the other 
platforms.  The XO also holds the Navigator NOBC code (9284) and VX2 AQD for 
naval C4.   
Operations Officer (OPS):  The OPS holds the same NOBC code as the other 
Non-NTDS platforms.  A noticeable difference between the MHC OPS and other OPS is 
that the MHC OPS is a Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG), which is junior than the other 
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OPS.  Typically, an OPS is a Department Head acting in a Department Head’s position.  
In the case of the MHC, the OPS is a Second Tour Division Officer action in a 
Department Head’s position.  The MHC OPS also holds a secondary NOBC code for 
Safety Officer (9967) which entails the following: Represents squadron or group 
commander or ship commanding officer in conduct of surface safety program. Maintains 
inter-command and interdepartmental liaison to further surface safety effort. Informs 
higher authority on findings of investigations, surveys and studies. Analyzes methods, 
practices, criteria and regulations to discover unsafe areas and recommend corrective 
actions.  If two NOBC codes were not enough, this Junior Officer position also includes a 
sub-specialty of 0089 (now 6201) for Information System and Technology and the VX1 
AQD for foundation in naval C4. 
First Lieutenant (1
st
) / Mine Sweeping Officer (Sweep): The primary and 
secondary NOBC codes for the MHC are the same as the MCM.  The difference is in the 
officer designation.  On the MHC, the officer is designated as an 1190 which is an 
Unrestricted Line Officer who is in training for Special Operations qualification. 
Chief Engineer (CHENG):  Similar to the MHC OPS, and different from the 
other platforms, the MHC CHENG is also a LTJG.  The CHENG carries the typical 
diesel NOBC code 9363, but also has the DCA NOBC code 9308.   
Table 7 displays the differences between the LCS PSMD and the MHC SMD.  
Similar to Table 5, the MCMs had a small officer corps, but it also included the hugely 
important 1st/Sweep NOBCs of 9242 and 9268 for Mine Warfare.  The Chief Engineer 
also requires two NOBCs, one of which is typically held by another officer.  An 
interesting difference is the inclusion of a Special Operations qualified officer in the 
Commanding Officer billet.  Although this was only included for half of the MHCs, it is 
perfectly practical and logical to include an officer with type of background to command 
and direct a ship whose main mission function is to prosecute mines, an operation that 
sometimes require assets other than surface vessels, such as diving personnel and 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal personnel.  
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Table 7.   Compared Occupational Standard between LCS and MHC 
(After NAVMAC, 2000) 
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IV. NAVAL OFFICER MANNING METRIC AND 
OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS 
This Chapter will introduce the current manning metric used by the United States 
Navy to place officers into billets on board navy vessels. The Chapter summarizes the 
similarities and differences of officer manpower requirements, based on Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) manpower guidance and Guided Missile Frigate, Mine Countermeasures 
Ship, and Coastal Minehunter Ship Manpower Documents (SMD).  Once the metric is 
defined and the ship class comparisons are made, a series of occupational standards and 
personal demographics will be developed to address the utility of the manning metric 
used when assigning Naval Officers to at-sea billets.   
The characteristics presented will provide a framework for a future quantitative 
analysis using the new manning metric for determining assignments.  This section 
examine a variety of characteristics that could be used as a metric to assign officers to 
LCS and other ships.  The following demographics and occupational standards are 
applicable to both officers enlisted personnel.  These types of personal characteristics and 
how they relate to one another should have measurable effects on how well individuals 
perform on the job.    
A. CURRENT MANNNING METRIC 
The manning metric used in this research deals primarily with the allocation 
portion of the distribution process.  The allocation portion centers on the Total Force 
Manpower Management System (TFMMS) and Officer Master File (OMF).  TFMMS 
allows for automatic data processing for manpower planning and the OMF contains 
occupational standards and historical information on an individual officer's performance.   
TFMMS and the OMF combined provide an extensive database to preview future officer 
requirements.  This is done by comparing future Officer Program Authorizations (OPA) 
programmed billets with future officer inventory.  This projection is a key research 
element because the occupational standards and personal demographics detailed in this 
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Chapter are linked to the OMF as a source for future sourcing of data in a revised 
manpower metric. 
In addition to the allocation portion of the process, the distribution triad includes 
Assignment and Placement, as indicated in Figure 7.  Assignment involves the slating 
process of officers through use of their Detailers, and is based on what billets are 
available.  The Placement portion involves an officer being present in an actual billet.    
 
Figure 7.  Officer Distribution Process (After CNO, 2007) 
1. Officer Assignment Process 
The officer assignment process is conducted through multiple, unofficial 
telephone conversations and emails with officer “Detailers” assigned to the Navy’s 
Personnel Command (PERS) in Millington, Tennessee.  The process begins when an 
officer enters their “slating window.”  The slating window is when the officer is within a 
predetermined time period, known as the Projected Rotation Date (PRD), from finishing 
their current assignment and assuming their new assignment.  During the slating window 
 53 
the officer is presented with a list of billets coming available throughout the Navy for the 
officer’s rank and designator (DESIG).   
When a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) is near the PRD of their First Division 
Officer or First Department Head tour, they come in to the slating window for deciding a 
Second Division Officer or Second Department Head tour.  The slate lists the billets 
available to the officer.  Once the slate is available, an officer makes their preferences 
know to the Detailer.  This is done through a list that priority ranks jobs (i.e., Operations 
Officer, Chief Engineer, etc.), locations (i.e., San Diego, Norfolk, etc.), and platforms 
(i.e., Cruiser, Destroyer, etc.).  Once the Detailer's list is complete, it is compared to the 
other officers in the slating window and they are ranked amongst their peers for available 
jobs.  
This ranking is based on several factors.  One of the most important factors, as 
explained through the conversations with the Detailers, is whether the officer is “Tac 
Plus” or “Tac Plus Plus.”  The distinction is dependent on the officer’s career path during 
the slating process.  An officer is considered Tac Plus if all the required qualifications 
(Officer of the Deck letter and Surface Warfare Qualification) and either an Engineering 
Officer of the Watch (EOOW) letter or a Tactical Action Officer (TAO) letter is obtained 
in their first tour.  In addition, the officer must possess an above average Reporting 
Senior Cumulative Average (RSCA) and Fitness Report (FITREP) inputs that include 
hard and soft breakouts.  An officer is considered Tac Plus Plus if they have met all the 
requirements for Tac Plus and have both the EOOW and TAO letters.  These are the main 
qualifications that are evaluated and accessed during the slating process, though other 
factors may be considered as well.  Simply stated, those officers who have more 
qualifications are ranked higher than those officers who do not have as many 
qualifications.  The Tac Plus consideration in the detailing process for LCS officers in 
comparison to officers being assigned to standard ships is shown in Figure 8.     
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Figure 8.  LCS Officer Detailing Process (After CNO, 2007) 
Once the officer’s qualities are tabulated, a ranking process is conducted for those 
officers that are in the same slating window.  The officer's ranking is matched against 
their preference so that the “best fit” is made when matching the officer to a billet.  
Needless to say, not every officer gets their choice of assignments.  The detailing process 
is prioritized in a manner where officers are ranked differently than other officers causing 
their preferences may work to both of their advantages.   
Initially, LCS assignments were conducted on a volunteer basis and only Tac Plus 
Plus officers were accepted.  Now, all officers who want to be assigned to LCS go 
through the same detailing process as those wanting to go to a Destroyer or Cruiser. 
Assignment depends on what is available during the slating window, where the officer 
ranks among their peers, and their preferences.  
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2. Manpower Composition and Comparison 
The quantity of officers required onboard LCS, as prescribed in the Preliminary 
Ship Manpower Document (PSMD) is eight.  These eight officers comprise the entire 
LCS command and control component while underway and operate its various designed 
mission states.  Once these eight LCS officers have been screened, they are assigned to a 
Navy Officer Billet Classifications (NOBC) specified in the PSMD.  While the PSMD 
summary is for the sea-frame, it does not include occupational requirements for the 
various Mission Packages (MP). The ramification of such limited requirements is that 
there is no consolidation of the specifications required by the LCS sea-frame crew who 
should be familiar and capable of the multi-faceted missions of the LCS.   
It should be understood that a PSMD is not a finalized version of LCS manpower 
requirements, and that a revised Ship Manpower Document (SMD) should be produced 
approximately one year after commissioning when major revisions have already occurred 
(CNO, 2007). The Littoral Combat Ships have been built, tested, commissioned, tested 
again, and ready to deploy.  USS Freedom and USS Independence have been in 
commission for more than a year and typically by this time NAVMAC would have 
completed an analysis and published a final SMD; but so far there has been little official 
change to the LCS manpower requirements.  Currently, no officer requirement exists that 
is associated with Anti-Surface (SUW), Anti-Submarine (ASW), or Mine Warfare 
(MIW).  While specific occupational standards may not be required because of the 
embarked personnel in the MP, it remains of major importance that officers, who are 
ultimately responsible for the sea-frame and its operations, be ready to conduct all 
primary missions.  The more refined the occupational standards, the better prepared the 
sea-frame and its crew will be to execute its designed capabilities.  
In comparison, the SMDs of the Guided Missile Frigates (FFG), 
Minecountermeasure ships (MCM), and Coastal Minehunters (MHC), the LCS PSMD 
appears deficient.  The issue arises because the nature of the LCS's mission when it 
assumes the missions of the decommissioning ship classes.  Research showed each ship 
class had manpower requirements that directly related to its assigned missions, which is 
not reflected in LCS's PSMD.    
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 The FFG includes several primary and secondary NOBCs.  Most notably, the 
FFG requires a Navigator and an Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer (ASWO).  In addition 
to these billets, their respective NOBCs for Navigation and ASW, are not included in the 
LCS PSMD.  Proper navigation is a critical occupational skill on all naval platforms and 
makes up the very backbone of the surface navy.   Similarly, ASW is one of the MPs 
LCS is to embark.  Although it may embark a MP that is geared towards a specific 
warfare mission, it is important to have sea-frame personnel that understand the mission.  
This involves the Designators (DESIG), NOBCs, Subspecialties (SSP), and Additional 
Qualification Designations (AQD) associated with the eight officers that comprise the 
sea-frame. 
In addition to the NOBCs, the FFG SMD lists SSPs and AQDs that are not 
included in the LCS PSMD.  An important SSP is held by the Commanding Officer 
(CO), 6301 for Undersea Warfare, which is directly related to the Undersea Warfare 
mission of the FFG.  Since the CO is responsible for the ship and its operations, the CO is 
required to be well versed in the specialty that is a primary mission of the vessel.  The 
CO should be able to rely on the other officers to have the occupational standards that are 
associated with these missions.  
The Combat Systems Officer (CSO) and Chief Engineer (CHENG) also are 
assigned SSPs for their related fields.  The CSO is assigned the 5700 SSP for experience 
in Combat Systems and the CHENG the 5600 SSP for experience in Mechanical 
Engineering.  The SSPs assigned to these officers is commensurate with the position of 
authority and responsibility they hold.  These SSPs are not directly related to warfare 
areas, but to the overall operation of the vessel; which is the most integral part of 
completing any mission. 
While the officer complement of the MCMs and MHCs is smaller than the FFG, 
both classes require NOBCs that are associated with their mission, as well as LCS.  These 
NOBCs are not listed in the LCS PSMD.  These NOBCs are for the Navigator, similar to 
the FFG, but also the First Lieutenant / Minesweeping Officer.  The NOBC for this 
position is similar to the ASWO on the FFG.  The mission of the Mine Countermeasure 
Ships and Coastal Minehunters is Mine Warfare.  Particular qualifications are required 
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for officers who must specialize in more than one warfare area.  The same is suitable for 
LCS where a sea-frame officer would hold an NOBC associated with the MP they 
represent or embark. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS AND OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS 
This section provides individual characteristics and occupational standards used 
to form a metric to assign officers to the Littoral Combat Ship.  These characteristics and 
standards may also be used to predict officer performance. 
1. Marital Status  
The marital status characteristic may consist of “married,” “single,” or “other,” 
where “other” is defined to include separated, divorced, or widowed/widower.  Marital 
status can have a perceived effect on overall performance or motivation of the officer.  If 
an officer is happily married, the officer may be more productive in a variety of ways.  
Conversely, if the officer is not happily married, then performance may deteriorate.  
Controlling for marital status is important because it can either directly impact 
productivity or be correlated with other officer characteristics or job characteristics that 
may impact productivity and success on the ship.   
2. Children 
Similar to marital status, having children may influence the performance of an 
officer.  The effect may be positive or negative depending on how children affect the 
officer’s performance.  While having a child is considered a joyful event by society, it 
does not mean that parents do not have their own trials and tribulations with children.  
Newborns require around the clock attention which may result in fatigue.  Fatigue can 
greatly hamper performance in the work place.  If parents are having a difficult time with 
their children then it can cause a person to refocus their priorities.  Conversely, people 
may work even harder to make sure they perform well which will help ensure job 
security that directly benefits a child.  This characteristic would allow a researcher to 
determine whether the existence of a dependent has an effect on performance after 
controlling for other variables.   
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3. Race 
Another demographic characteristic that should be used as a control variable in an 
analysis is race.  It is possible that performance, motivation, or other measures of success 
may vary with race.  Race is a frequently examined variable in the military that needs to 
be examined to determine the diversity by service.  A statistical analysis would show 
what race percentages comprise the Surface Warfare community and the distribution of 
where these officers serve.  This information would allow decision makers to gather 
important insights in how to incentivize officers to join and future career paths.  
4. Education 
The education characteristic may distinguish between those who have received a 
Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science degree.  Type of degree is important to observe 
in order to determine if performance of a particular job on the ship differs across 
disciplines.  It could provide information on which type of educational degree may be 
more sought after for a Surface Warfare Officer being assigned to LCS.  Midshipman, 
regardless of academic major are required to take courses in Calculus and Calculus-based 
Physics.  This requirement alone exhibits a strong preference for mathematics and 
science skills as they pertain to the naval service. 
Additionally, it would be useful to observe if the officer has continued their 
education in the form of a Master's degree or any other type of follow-on education.  One 
might expect that the physical degree does not have a large effect on officer performance 
in the division officer tours, but may be more important as an officer advances in 
seniority.  However, the importance may only be prominent depending on what billet the 
officer is assigned.  For example, a Chief Engineer may fair better with a technical 
background, while an Operations Officer may be indifferent to type of background.  The 
purpose of including additional educational variables is to determine if higher education 
should be a requirement for future officers.  One might expect that a Master's Degree or 
other type of education beyond undergraduate degree will assist an officer in performance 
because education is being advanced past what is initially required. 
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5. Commissioning Source 
The commissioning source characteristic was chosen to determine if there is a 
difference in officer performance.  The sources of commissioning are the United States 
Naval Academy (USNA), Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC), or Officer 
Candidate School (OCS).   
Officers graduating from the Naval Academy have typically gone through a 
rigorous four years of naval indoctrination and advanced studies that incorporate a basic 
understanding in mathematics, physics, naval history, and maritime principles.  Naval 
Academy graduates are typically 22 to 23 years of age, indicating that they advanced 
straight from high school in to the rigors of Annapolis.  However, as evident in recent 
years, there has been an increase of prior service members commissioning from the 
Academy, meaning that they served as an enlisted person before seeking an officer’s 
commission.  
Graduates from ROTC are similar to USNA graduates wherein the majority are 
22 to 23 years old.  What separates ROTC from the Academy is that the USNA students 
live a “normal” college life where their only obligation to the military, during their 
college tenure, is to where a uniform once or twice a week and take part in Naval Science 
courses, which builds the foundation for their military service.  ROTC students are 
physically and mentally trained in to the maritime lifestyle, but not to the extent of 
Academy students.  Additionally, a larger percentage of ROTC graduates may have been 
prior service, or be older in age when graduating.  OCS graduates vary in age and 
background.  Some have spent time as enlisted service members and are commissioned 
through various programs such as OCS.  Others are college aged students that had a 
standard college experience that did not include ROTC or any type of military training or 
orientation.  These graduates only know what they learn at OCS before being sent to their 
first assignment and may have a relatively high learning curve than those that had been 
enlisted, graduated ROTC, or graduated from the Naval Academy.  
There could be varied expectations when it comes to the commissioning source 
characteristic.  Graduates from the Naval Academy will have received the most training 
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when it comes to the basics of being an officer, as well as an introduction to navigation 
and seamanship.  For four years they will have learned the ins and outs of naval heritage.  
They will be expected to rise above their peers once commissioned and to be able to 
functionally perform when first reporting to their duty station.  It would not be surprising 
if those who were commissioned through the Naval Academy are stronger performers on 
the ship in comparison to ROTC and OCS graduates.  However, ROTC carries a wide-
variety of commissioned persons that can have certain attributes that are more favorable 
than Academy graduates.  Additionally, OCS graduates may have years of experience in 
enlisted service that serves as a vital guide to a newly commissioned officer.  Therefore it 
would be important to distinguish how the commissioning source impacts performance.  
6. Prior Tours 
The prior tours characteristic could provide information on how the differences in 
previous assignment to Weapons, Combat Systems, Engineering, Operations, and 
Executive Departments has an effect on future performance on the LCS.  This is an 
extremely important characteristic because an officer would, theoretically, perform better 
in a billet that the officer is already familiar.  If an officer had served as a Strike Warfare 
Officer (which is in Combat Systems Department) during a First Tour Division Officer 
billet, then it may be wise to assign that officer to a Fire Control Officer (Combat 
Systems Department) billet during a Second Tour Division Officer billet.  This would 
allow for continuity between assignments in the same warfare area which would 
hopefully help with performance.  Conversely, if an officer did not perform well in an 
earlier billet, it may be wise to transfer them from one department in to a billet in a 
different department.   
The LCS officer billets are Commanding and Executive Officers, Department 
Head (Operations, Combat Systems, and Engineering), and Division Officer (composed 
of Junior Officers).  All of these Department Head billets are held on other platforms 
with a wide variety of billets occurring at the Junior Officer level across the multiple 
ship classes.  
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For Weapons and Combat Systems Departments, an officer may have served in a 
variety of related billets such as Gunnery Officer, Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer, 
Minesweeping Officer, or as the lead in the department as the Weapons Officer or 
Combat Systems Officer.  The weapon systems found on the LCS are quite advanced in 
comparison to the ships it is replacing.   The other platform that is most similar in 
technology to the LCS are the AEGIS Cruisers and Destroyers. 
Engineering department revolves around the type of engineering plant.  The LCS 
has a combined gas turbine and diesel engine propulsion.  These types of propulsion 
systems are also found on other platforms which provide a smooth transition among 
similar systems. 
Similar to Engineering, Operations and Executive Departments play similar roles 
on the other types of platforms in the Navy.  Operations tends to deal with the day to day 
scheduling of the ship while Executive Department will make up the administrative 
portion of a ships day to day operation.   
7. Prior Platform 
The prior platform variable is examined because of the different responsibilities 
and abilities that each class possesses and what they are expected to retain in regards to 
technologies and capabilities.  It would be useful to determine whether prior platforms 
predict success of an officer on the LCS.  Furthermore, it is important to understand how 
demographic and job characteristics of officers on prior platforms contributed to their 
past success and how that success might transfer over to the LCS. 
The most advanced ships that officers may have served on prior to the LCS are 
the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and the AEGIS platforms that include the Ticonderoga-
class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.  These ships contain the most 
sophisticated technology in the modern day fleet; they also have the largest roles for 
naval seapower.  Some officers may have previously served on the platforms that the 
LCS is set to replace.  These include the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile 
frigates, Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters, and Avenger-class Mine Countermeasures 
ship.  These officers will have been exposed to the missions that the LCS is designed to 
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execute: surface warfare, submarine warfare, and mine warfare.  Similar to these classes 
in size, maneuverability, and mission is the Cyclone-class Patrol Coastal (PC).  Like 
MCMs and PCs, it is envisioned that hull swapping will be at the core of LCS manpower. 
Other Surface Warfare platforms are the amphibious ships, or commonly referred 
to as “Gators.”  Gators encompass different missions than those previously mentioned.  
These missions mainly include support to Marine Corps operations, as well as 
humanitarian aid and non-combat evacuations.  The main types of ships are Amphibious 
Assault Ships (LHA/LHD), Amphibious Command Ships (LCC), Amphibious Transport 
Docks (LPD), and Dock Landing Ships (LSD).  The LHA/LHD resemble smaller carriers 
and are used for transport of helicopters and vertical take-off aircraft such as Harrier jets.  
The LCC are used for just as the name implies, command and control.  LPDs and LSDs 
are used to transport larger quantities of vehicles.  All of these amphibious ships have 
large crews and bear little resemblance to the LCS or any of the ship classes the LCS is 
set to replace.  
8. Service Area (Homeport) 
Similar to the differences between ship platforms, the location of where an officer 
served may affect their level of experience.  This job characteristic may provide insight 
into different levels of operational capacity or speed of operational tempo that an officer 
may be associated. 
Officers that have served on ships home-ported in Japan and Hawaii are 
accustomed to a very high operational tempo.  The majority of their operations support 
regional security in the vicinity of China and North Korea.   
Conversely, the areas of San Diego/Washington and Norfolk/Mayport, the 
respective west coast and east coasts bases, are used to a more structured operational 
tempo where their ships are only underway for training cycles and the regularly 
scheduled deployment. These officers may have only short-noticed sortied for a hurricane 
or natural disaster relief, wherein officers from Japan/Hawaii expect and/or are sortied 
regularly.  The differences between these areas may be important depending upon the 
type of operational tempo the LCS is going to be assigned.  The LCS optempo may be 
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based on where the ships are located, as well as what type of demand there is for their 
platform capabilities.  Those officers that are used to a high operational tempo may be 
better suited on an LCS of similar tempo, as would an officer who is use to a structured 
optempo on a similarly assigned LCS.   
9. Naval Officer Qualifications  
Naval Officer Billet Classifications (NOBC), Subspecialties, and Additional 
Qualification Designation (AQD) are possible variables that cover the universal 
qualifications that are associated with all Naval Officers.  They are defined in the Manual 
of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Qualifications and are annotated in a Ship’s 
Manpower Document as to what is expected of the officers to have as qualifications when 
assigned to the platform.  It is these qualifications and how officers function in them that 
may have a large impact on how successful and competent they are during their 
assignments to billets.  These are the types of characteristics and how the officers handle 
them that need significant consideration when an officer is considered for future 
assignments.  
10. Officer Performance and Measurement 
The following information is in regards to those systems used to measure Officers 
performance against their peers.  These three different variables may be useful when it 
comes to assigning officers to a billet, especially on LCS, because it can possibly be seen 
as to how successful and officer may have been when the information was reported.  This 
is what is to be focused on if the manning metric is changed from its current format in to 
one that takes in to consideration the past performances and rankings of themselves, by 
their superiors, amongst their peers.  These variables are the “Officer Trait Average,” and 
“Reporting Senior Cumulative Average.”  
a. Officer Trait Average 
The Officer Trait Average (OTA) refers to the Member Trait Average 
section of the Fitness Report.  This is where the different rankings that the Reporting 
Senior has assigned to the officer and are averaged to be compared against the other 
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officers.  The average may fall anywhere between 1 and 5, with 1 signifying the lowest 
grade and 5 signifying the best grade.  According to the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) 
Instruction 1610.10C: Navy Performance Evaluation System, “the performance trait 
grade of 3.0 represents performance to full Navy standards” (2011).  The importance of 
this average is that it shows where the officer stands in performance capabilities and 
accomplishments in comparison the officer’s peer.   
b. Reporting Senior Cumulative Average 
The OTA is coupled with the Reporting Senior Cumulative Average 
(RSCA) because the RCSA is what the OTA is compared to.  Every reporting senior has 
an RSCA that “travels” with them throughout their reporting career.  So, the OTA is not 
only compared to current peers, but also all those in that rank that the reporting senior has 
rated in the average.  This RSCA can be compared to a unit of measurement as what they 
reporting senior believes to be his or her performance bar.  If the rated officer is 
performing above the RSCA, than he or she is performing above the average, and vice 
versa rated below the average.   
c. Promotion Status 
The Promotion Status of an officer is decided by the Reporting Senior and 
annotated on the FITREP.  This status allows for a review board to see if the officer has 
been regarded and recommend for promotion, an important aspect of the FITREP.  The 
Promotion Status on the FITREP consists of a five grade range.  The first two are the 
most un-desirable and are for those that are underperforming.  The third is for officers 
that are deemed “Promotable.”  They are considered to be right in the middle of the 
population, and for Junior Officers, this is the only rating they will receive in their first 
four years of commissioned service.  The next two ratings, “Must Promote” and “Early 
Promote,” are the most sought after as these are for the top performers.  Only a certain 
amount of the officer may receive one of these two ratings.  Receiving one is based on 
the cumulative power of everything else on the FITREP, including the Member Trait 
Average in comparison to the Reporting Senior Cumulative Average.   
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was developed to be capable of countering 
multiple near shore threats with a proposed sea-frame crew of only forty personnel and an 
embarked Mission Package (MP).  The LCS’s design and brown-water objectives are 
becoming main-stream after decades of open-ocean operations.   
The ship's sea-frame crew has a rotational crew; one crew is relieved by another 
so that the sea-frame may spend more time in an operational status.  The MPs that will be 
embarked on each variant will enable different detachments with different missions to 
operate in the realms of Anti-Submarine, Anti-Surface, and Mine Warfare.  These single-
ship operators will encompass the same missions as the Oliver Hazard Perry-class 
Guided Missile Frigates (FFG), Avenger-class Mine Countermeasure (MCM) ships, and 
Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters (MHC).   
A thorough literature review and a historical overview examined the manpower 
requirements and occupational standards across these different platforms and provided a 
cross comparison to LCS.  Concurrently, the manning metric used to assess and 
determine officer placement was reviewed.   
The LCS Preliminary Ship Manpower Document (PSMD) was compared to the 
Ship Manpower Document (SMD) of the Guided Missile Frigates (FFG), 
Minecountermeasures ships (MCM), and Coastal Minehunters (MHC).  The comparison 
examined Navy Officer Billet Classifications (NOBC), Subspecialties (SSP), and 
Additional Qualification Designations (AQD) from the SMDs of the FFGs, MCMs, and 
MHCs.  
Several variables outside of occupational standards such as marital status, 
children, and race, were examined to better understand their effect on future performance.  
Occupational standards were examined because some of them are the actual 
characteristics that are used to determine success; and some are those that should be 
included in future models.   
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The detailing process was examined although a standard operating procedure did 
not exist.  The process involved a simple procedure that was explained in Chapter IV and 
included a ranking of officers compared to open officer billets, at a given time.  While 
LCS had certain resources reserved for it in its initial stages, it has become similar to 
other combatants to when it comes to the assignment of officer manpower. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. What significant differences exist from the transition of prior ship 
classes to the LCS in regards to manpower qualifications and 
characteristics? 
a. Conclusion 
The qualitative analysis of the manpower assigned to the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) confirms a shortage of officers.  Eight officers stand the Command and 
Control watches and support a watch rotation of five hours on and ten hours off, or “five 
and dime.”  The Surface Navy is accustom to overworking officer watch standers IAW 
policy, as evidenced by the increasingly smaller crew sizes across all surface ships.   
The current officer requirements does not support vertical mentorship or 
increase fleet experience, meaning that those Junior Officers who stand the Officer of the 
Deck watch will only have time for that watch and their administrative duties.   
These differences in manpower from the FFGs, MCMs, and MHCs are 
quite significant from the Littoral Combat Ship.  Some of these differences are to be 
expected because of monetary pressure to decrease manpower.  Nevertheless, this 
decrease should not come at the cost of experience and reliability.  The LCS should 
incorporate the mission focus areas from the previous ship classes.  This should be 
conducted through the NOBCs, SSPs, and AQDs.  These may be assigned to the officer 
complement already on board, or to new officer that may become an addition in future 
SMDs.  Regardless, the number of officers will remain smaller than a FFG and be 
comparable to the MCMs and MHCs.  
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b. Recommendation  
Increase the number of 1110 officer requirements on LCS.  Additional 
officers should be placed on the Littoral Combat Ship and be annotated on the SMD 
whenever it occurs.  The Program Executive Office and PERS-41 in the Bureau of 
Personnel is responsible for the initial billets and assignments to them. The Navy 
Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) is responsible for the SMD.   
2. What officer characteristics and rankings may the Navy use when 
assigning an officer to a LCS platform, based on historical and ship-
specific requirements, and how may the assignment be applied?  
a. Conclusion  
The NOBCs, SSPs, and AQDs are the occupational standards that define 
the officers of the vessels.  Additionally, how an officer performs in prior billets presents 
a forecast of how they may perform in future assignments.  The Officer Trait Average, 
Reporting Senior Cumulative Average, and Promotion Status also provide a review of the 
officer and their professional characteristics and performance.  These averages and status 
are important attributes that are tracked in the same format throughout the Navy and 
provide level comparisons.    
The current manning metric does not consider many of the characteristics 
when assigning officers to billets.  Yet, these characteristics may yield important 
information when comparing the officer profile to the billet requiring a qualified officer.  
The officer characteristics and occupational standards contained in this 
thesis are meant to provide an alternative way to look at what can be included in the 
officer assigning metric.  In order to determine whether these characteristics and 
standards are significant, a quantitative study needs to be conducted.   
Access to both personal and professional files for the officers that have 
served on the LCS would have to be granted through the Bureau of Personnel in 




Have PERS-41 assemble characteristic data as examined in this research 
to develop a more refined approach to placement and assignment of officer onboard LCS. 
3. When were LCS manpower requirements last reviewed by Navy 
Manpower Analysis Center? 
a. Conclusion 
This research concludes neither officer or enlisted requirements have been 
reviewed in a manner customary with other deployable forces IAW OPNAVINST 
1000.16K. 
b. Recommendation 
Recommend CNO N1 direct manpower review to develop first SMD. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has been mainly qualitative in nature.  Quantitative study should be 
conducted that includes data on the variables described in Chapter IV.  A quantitative 
study would provide empirical evidence on which job characteristics or personal 
demographics are important to consider when assigning officers to the LCS.  This 
information could prove vital in the assignment of officers and how well they will 
perform on a given platform.   
This type of research does not have to be necessarily conducted on officers or 
LCS.  It may be altered to include any other type of naval platform or group of personnel.  
The organizations who determine the manpower for these types of platforms and the 
interests of those who operate these platforms would be essential in order to conduct a 
more rigorous quantitative analysis.  Information must be made available so that proper 
research can be conducted in a timely and efficient manner.  The Naval Postgraduate 
School could work more closely with the Navy's Personnel Command in Millington, 
Tennessee and search out Surface Warfare stakeholders.  
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APPENDIX C. NAVY FACT FILE FOR OLIVER HAZARD PERRY-
CLASS GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE 
Description 
Frigates fulfill a Protection of Shipping mission as Anti-Submarine Warfare 
combatants for amphibious expeditionary forces, underway replenishment groups and 
merchant convoys. 
Background 
Guided missile frigates are short range anti-air warfare capable using their 
Phalanx Close-In Weapon System.  Designed as cost efficient surface combatants, they 
lack the multi-mission capability necessary for modern surface combatants faced with 
multiple, high-technology threats. They also offer limited capacity for growth.  The 
Surface Combatant Force Requirement Study does not define any need for a single 
mission ship such as the frigate and there are no frigates planned in the Navy’s five-year 
shipbuilding plan. 
General Characteristics  
 Date Deployed: 17 December 1977 (USS Oliver Hazard Perry) 
 Propulsion: Two General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engines; 1 shaft, 
41,000 shaft horsepower total.  
 Length: 445 feet (133.5 meters); 453 feet (135.9 meters) with LAMPS III 
modification. 
 Beam: 45 feet (13.5 meters). 
 Displacement: 4100 to 4,300 long tons full load (4165. 8 to 4,369 metric 
tons) 
 Armament: Six MK-46 torpedoes(from two triple mounts); One 76 mm 
(3-inch)/62 caliber MK 75 rapid fire gun; One Phalanx close-in-weapons 
system 
 Speed: 29+ knots 
 Crew: 17 officers and 198 Enlisted  
 Aircraft: Two SH-60 (LAMPS III) or One SH-2 (Lamps Mk-I) in FFG 9-
19, 30, 31. 
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APPENDIX D. NAVY FACT FILE FOR AVENGER-CLASS MINE 
COUNTERMEASURES SHIP 
Description  
Ships designed to clear mines from vital waterways. 
Background 
Avenger-class ships are designed as mine sweepers/hunter-killers capable of 
finding, classifying and destroying moored and bottom mines.  These ships use sonar and 
video systems, cable cutters and a mine detonating device that can be released and 
detonated by remote control. They are also capable of conventional sweeping measures. 
The ships are of fiberglass sheathed, wooden hull construction. 
General Characteristics  
 Date Deployed: Sept. 12, 1987 (USS Avenger)  
 Propulsion: Four diesels (600 horsepower each), two shafts with 
controllable pitch propellers. 
 Length: 224 feet (68.28 meters). 
 Beam: 39 feet (11.89 meters). 
 Displacement: 1,312 tons (1,333.06 metric tons) full load. 
 Speed: 14 knots (16.1 mph, 25.76 kmph). 
 Crew: 8 officers, 76 enlisted. 
 Armament: Mine neutralization system. Two .50 caliber machine guns. 
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APPENDIX E. NAVY FACT FILE FOR OSPREY-CLASS COASTAL 
MINEHUNTER SHIP 
Description 
Ships designed to clear mines from vital waterways. 
Background 
Osprey-class ships were mine hunter-killers capable of finding, classifying and 
destroying moored and bottom mines. The MHC 51 had a 15-day endurance and depends 
on a support ship or shore based facilities for resupply.  These ships use sonar and video 
systems, cable cutters and a mine detonating device that can be released and detonated by 
remote control. They are also capable of conventional sweeping measures. The ships’ 
hulls are made of glass-reinforced plastic fiberglass. They were the first large mine 
countermeasures ships built in the United States in nearly 27 years.  
General Characteristics 
 Date Deployed: 20 Nov 1993 (USS Osprey)  
 Propulsion: Two diesels (800 hp each); two Voith-Schneider (cycloidal) 
propulsion systems 
 Length: 188 feet (57.3 meters) 
 Beam: 36 feet (11 meters) 
 Displacement: 893 tons (907.33 metric tons) full load 
 Speed: 10 knots (18.4 kmph) 
 Crew: 5 officers, 46 enlisted 
 Armament: Two .50 caliber machine guns, Mine Neutralization System 
and other mine countermeasures systems 
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